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Abstract
Computability logic is a formal theory of computational tasks and resources. Formulas in it represent
interactive computational problems, and “truth” is understood as algorithmic solvability. Interactive
computational problems, in turn, are defined as a certain sort games between a machine and its envi-
ronment, with logical operators standing for operations on such games. Within the ambitious program
of finding axiomatizations for incrementally rich fragments of this semantically introduced logic, the
earlier article “From truth to computability I” proved soundness and completeness for system CL3,
whose language has the so called parallel connectives (including negation), choice connectives, choice
quantifiers, and blind quantifiers. The present paper extends that result to the significantly more ex-
pressive system CL4 with the same collection of logical operators. What makes CL4 expressive is the
presence of two sorts of atoms in its language: elementary atoms, representing elementary computational
problems (i.e. predicates, i.e. problems of zero degree of interactivity), and general atoms, representing
arbitrary computational problems. CL4 conservatively extends CL3, with the latter being nothing but
the general-atom-free fragment of the former. Removing the blind (classical) group of quantifiers from
the language of CL4 is shown to yield a decidable logic despite the fact that the latter is still first-order.
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1 Introduction
Being a continuation of [6], this article fully relies on the terminology, notation, conventions and technical
results of its predecessor, with which the reader is assumed to be familiar.
The atoms of our old friend CL3 represent predicates rather than computational problems in general.
So, CL3 only allows us to talk about elementary problems and their particular (¬,∧,∨,→,⊓,⊔,⊓,⊔,∀,∃)-
combinations. This is a rather serious limitation of expressive power. By far not every natural problem of
potential interest can be expressed as a combination of the above sort, including all problems with infinitely
or arbitrarily long legal runs. And even though finite strict games such as chess always can be, in principle,
represented as ⊓,⊔-combinations of elementary games (terminal positions), the sizes of such representations
would often be beyond reasonable. To get a feel of what is missing in CL3, imagine a situation where
we just want to be able to directly say “Chess”, “Go” etc. (i.e. have these as atoms), and then ask
questions such as whether and how the problem (of winning) Go ⊔ (Chess ∧ Checkers) can be reduced to
(Go⊔Chess)∧(Go⊔Checkers). CL3 does not give us this ability because its formalism does not allow atoms
for non-elementary problems. True, CL3 still might help us find a positive answer to at least the ‘whether’
part of the above particular question. Specifically, in view of the soundness of CL3, its would suffice to
show that, for all formulas E,F,G, CL3 proves (E ⊔ F ) ∧ (E ⊔G) → E ⊔ (F ∧ G). This, however, would
require some creative reasoning in the metatheory of CL3 rather than CL3 itself. And even if we managed
to succeed in this metareasoning, we still would not be able to automatically conclude that every problem
of the form A⊔ (B ∧C) is algorithmically reducible to (A⊔B)∧ (A⊔C). Rather, we would only know that
this is so as long as A,B,C are (¬,∧,∨,→,⊓,⊔,⊓,⊔,∀,∃)-combinations of elementary problems. While
the class of problems of this sort is certainly interesting and nontrivial, it — as already pointed out — is
only a modest fraction of the collection of all entities that we call interactive computational problems.
By simply redefining the semantics of the language of CL3 and no longer requiring that its atoms be
interpreted as elementary problems, we would certainly gain a lot. But perhaps just as much would be
lost: the class of valid formulas would shrink, victimizing many important and innocent principles. The
point is that elementary problems are meaningful and interesting in their own right, and losing the ability
to differentiate them from problems in general would be too much of a sacrifice. What else would be
automatically gone is the nice fact that classical logic is a fragment of the new logic.
Computability logic has a better solution. It simply allows two sorts of atoms in its language, one for
elementary problems and the other for all problems. This way, not only do we have the ability to characterize
valid principles for problems of either sort within the same formal system, but we can as well capture
principles that intermix elementary problems with not-necessarily-elementary ones. Such an approach also
has technical advantages. As we are going to see, logic CL4, whose language extends that of CL3 by adding
to it the second sort of atoms, has a rather simple axiomatization, while it remains unclear whether there is
a reasonable deductive system for the fragment of computability logic whose language only has the second
sort of atoms.1
This article is primarily devoted to a soundness and completeness proof for the above-mentioned system
CL4. Its secondary result is a proof of the decidability of the ∀,∃-free (yet first-order) fragment of CL4.
These results, with a forward reference to the present paper, have been announced in [3, 8]. Soundness and
completeness for the propositional fragment CL2 of CL4 was proven in [5]. The present article strengthens
the results of its predecessor in the same sense as [5] strengthens [4], the difference being that here we deal
with the dramatically more expressive first-order level, as opposed to the propositional level of [4, 5].
Mathematical curiosity aside, the main practical import of our results is first of all related to the potential
of basing applied theories or knowledge base systems on CL4, the latter being a reasonable, computationally
meaningful alternative to classical logic. The non-logical axioms — or knowledgebase — of a CL4-based ap-
plied system/theory would be any collection of (formulas representing) problems whose algorithmic solutions
are known. Then our soundness result for CL4, which comes in a strong form called uniform-constructive
soundness, guarantees that every theorem T of the theory also has an algorithmic solution and that, further-
more, such a solution, itself, can be effectively constructed from a proof of T . This makes CL4 a systematic
1The very recently conceived syntactic approach, called cirquent calculus [7], does provide a nice axiomatization for a certain
fragment of computability logic in a language that only has the second sort of atoms. The language of that fragment is only a
modest fraction of that of CL4 though, and, while the cirquent calculus approach seems promising, at this point CL4 remains
by far the most expressive system for computability logic known to be sound and complete.
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problem-solving tool: finding a solution for a given problem reduces to finding a proof of that problem in
a CL4-based theory, with completeness meaning that, in its language, CL4 is as perfect/strong as as a
formal tool could possibly be. Section 6 of [6] discussed some of the advantages and appeal of basing applied
systems on CL3.2 That discussion, however, dealt with systems where the new logical operators (those of
computability logic) were applied to the old non-logical atoms (those of classical logic): predicates. CL4
offers a more far-reaching way for enriching traditional applied systems, allowing us to include in their vo-
cabularies atoms that represent higher-level entities: computational problems of arbitrary complexities and
degrees of interactivity, including infinite dialogues between a problem-solving agent and its environment.
This is a substantially new level of expressiveness that the needs of advanced interactive applied systems
would be inherently calling for.
2 Logic CL4
Let us rename what in [6] was called “predicate letters” into “elementary letters”. The language of CL4
augments that of CL3 with an additional sort of syntactic objects called general letters, again each such
object coming with a fixed arity. “Letter” is a common name for elementary and general letters. It is
assumed that, for every n ≥ 0, there are infinitely many n-ary letters of either sort. All general letters are
considered non-logical. An atom of the language of CL4 is L(t1, . . . , tn), where L is an n-ary letter and
each ti is a term, i.e. (as before) an element of the set of variables {v0, v1, . . .} or constants {0, 1, . . .}. This
atom is said to be n-ary because L is so. In a similar way, we extend the usage of the terms “elementary”,
“general”, “non-logical” etc. from letters to atoms. CL4-formulas, or henceforth often simply formulas,
are built from atoms in the same way asCL3-formulas, using the “propositional” connectives ¬,∧,∨,→,⊓,⊔
and quantifiers ∀,∃,⊓,⊔. The definition of a free occurrence of a variable x is as before: this means that
the occurrence is not in the scope of ∀x,∃x,⊓x or ⊔x. When a given occurrence of a variable x is in the
scope of Qx for more than one quantifier Q, the occurrence is considered bound by the quantifier “nearest”
to it. E.g., the occurrence of x in ∀x(R ⊔⊔xP (x)) is bound by ⊔ rather than ∀. An occurrence bound by
∀ or ∃ is said to be blindly bound.
An interpretation for the language of CL4 is a function that sends each n-ary general (resp. elementary
non-logical) letter L to a problem (resp. elementary problem) with an attached tuple (x1, . . . , xn) of n
pairwise distinct variables. We denote such a problem by L∗(x1, . . . , xn), call (x1, . . . , xn) the canonical
tuple of L∗, and say that “∗ interprets L as L∗(x1, . . . , xn)”. There is no redundancy in saying so,
for this phrase conveys nontrivial information about the context-setting canonical tuple — a context in
which, according to our earlier conventions (Section 4 of [6]), we can unambiguously write L∗(t1, . . . , tn)
to mean L∗[x1/t1, . . . , xn/tn]. Sometimes, however, there is no need in being specific about the canonical
tuple. In such cases we may simply write “L∗”, which should be strictly understood as an abbreviation for
L∗(x1, . . . , xn) where (x1, . . . , xn) is the canonical tuple of L
∗.
Note that, just as in the case of CL3, we do not insist that interpretations respect the arities of letters.
Specifically, we do not require that L∗ depend on only (or all) the variables from its canonical tuple, or even
be finitary. To avoid the possibility of unpleasant collisions of variables under such a liberal approach, in
[6] interpretations were restricted to “admissible” ones. Some additional caution is necessary in the present
case, as we need to guarantee that ∀x and ∃x are only applied to games for which they are defined, i.e.
x-unistructural games. Therefore the concept of admissibility now sharpens as follows:
Definition 2.1 For a formula F and interpretation ∗, we say that ∗ is F -admissible, or admissible for
F , iff, for every n-ary letter L of F , the following two conditions are satisfied:
(i) L∗ does not depend on any variables that are not in its canonical tuple but occur in F .
(ii) Suppose F contains an occurrence of L(t1, . . . , tn), the occurrence of ti (1 ≤ i ≤ n) within which is
blindly bound in F . Then L∗ is unistructural in the ith variable of its canonical tuple.
Notice that condition (ii) of the above definition is automatically satisfied when L is elementary, because
an elementary problem is always unistructural. That is why this condition was absent in [6]. In most typical
2A more elaborated discussion of applied systems based on computability logic can be found in Section 8 of [3] or Section
10 of [8]. See also Sections 26-28 of [2].
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cases we will be interested in interpretations ∗ that interpret each letter L as a finitary unistructural game
L∗(x1, . . . , xn) which does not depend on any variables other than x1, . . . , xn, so that both conditions (i) and
(ii) of Definition 2.1 will be automatically satisfied. With this remark in mind, henceforth we may sometimes
omit “F -admissible” and simply say “interpretation”; every time an expression F ∗ is used in a context, it
should be understood that the range of ∗ is restricted to F -admissible interpretations.
Every interpretation ∗ extends from letters to formulas in the obvious way: where L is an n-ary letter
interpreted as L∗(x1, . . . , xn) and t1, . . . , tn are any terms,
(
L(t1, . . . , tn)
)∗
= L∗(t1, . . . , tn); ⊤∗ = ⊤;
(¬G)∗ = ¬(G∗); (G1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Gn)∗ = G∗1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ G
∗
n; (∀xG)∗ = ∀x(G∗); etc. We say that a formula F is
valid iff, for every F -admissible interpretation ∗, the problem F ∗ is computable.
Since the blind operations are only partial functions, the above inductive definition of F ∗ does not quite
automatically guarantee that F ∗ is always defined, so the following fact needs to be verified for safety, which
will be formally done in Section 7:
Fact 2.2 For any formula F and F -admissible interpretation ∗, the game F ∗ is defined.
We extend to the language of CL4 the notational conventions from [6] (Section 5) regarding the meaning
of E[x1/t1, . . . , xn/tn] and representing formulas in the form E(x1, . . . , xn), which sets a context allowing us
to write E(t1, . . . , tn) instead of E[x1/t1, . . . , xn/tn].
The terms “negative occurrence” and “positive occurrence” have the same meaning as before. Similarly,
a surface occurrence of a subexpression in a formula is an occurrence that is not in the scope of ⊓,⊔,⊓,⊔.
When a formula does not contain any of these four operators, it is said to be elementary. The elementa-
rization of a formula E is the result of replacing in E every surface occurrence of the form G1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Gn
or ⊓xG by ⊤, every surface occurrence of the form G1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Gn or ⊔xG by ⊥, every positive surface
occurrence of each general atom by ⊥, and every negative surface occurrence of each general atom by ⊤. A
formula is stable iff its elementarization is a valid formula of classical logic.3 Otherwise it is instable.
The rules of inference of CL4 are the three rules A, B1 and B2 of CL3 — only, now applied to any
CL4-formulas rather than just CL3-formulas — plus one single additional rule C. Here are all four rules:
A ~H 7→ E, where E is stable and ~H is a set of formulas satisfying the following conditions:
(i) Whenever E has a positive (resp. negative) surface occurrence of a subformula G1 ⊓ . . .⊓Gn (resp.
G1 ⊔ . . .⊔Gn), for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ~H contains the result of replacing that occurrence in E by
Gi;
(ii) Whenever E has a positive (resp. negative) surface occurrence of a subformula ⊓xG(x) (resp.
⊔xG(x)), ~H contains the result of replacing that occurrence in E by G(y) for some variable y
not occurring in E.
B1 H 7→ E, where H is the result of replacing in E a negative (resp. positive) surface occurrence of a
subformula G1 ⊓ . . . ⊓Gn (resp. G1 ⊔ . . . ⊔Gn) by Gi for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
B2 H 7→ E, where H is the result of replacing in E a negative (resp. positive) surface occurrence of a
subformula ⊓xG(x) (resp. ⊔xG(x)) by G(t) for some term t such that (if t is a variable) neither the
above occurrence of ⊓xG(x) (resp. ⊔xG(x)) in E nor any of the free occurrences of x in G(x) are in
the scope of ∀t, ∃t, ⊓t or ⊔t.
C H 7→ E, where H is the result of replacing in E two — one positive and one negative — surface
occurrences of some n-ary general letter by an n-ary non-logical elementary letter that does not occur
in E.
Let us agree that, throughout this paper (with one little exception in Section 5), the uppercase P,Q,R, S
always stand for general letters and the lowercase p, q, r, s for non-logical elementary letters. In any given
context, all these letters will be assumed to be pairwise distinct, and the arity of each letter will be the
3Stability is meant to be a syntactic concept, yet its definition seemingly relies on the semantical notion of classical validity.
No problem: in view of Go¨del’s completeness theorem, “valid formula of classical logic” can be understood as a lazy way to say
“provable formula of classical predicate calculus”.
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length of the tuple of terms attached to it. When a letter L is 0-ary, we write L rather than L(). x, y, z will
always stand for variables (again, usually assumed to be pairwise distinct), t for terms, and c for constants.
Looking at a few examples should help us get a syntactic feel of our most unusual deductive system. The
following is a CL4-proof of ⊓x⊔y
(
P (x)→ P (y)
)
:
1. p(z)→ p(z) (from {} by Rule A)
2. P (z)→ P (z) (from 1 by Rule C)
3. ⊔y
(
P (z)→ P (y)
)
(from 2 by Rule B2)
4. ⊓x⊔y
(
P (x)→ P (y)
)
(from {3} by Rule A)
On the other hand, CL4 6⊢ ⊔y⊓x
(
P (x) → P (y)
)
. Indeed, obviously this instable formula cannot be
the conclusion of any rule but B2. If it is derived by this rule, the premise should be ⊓x
(
P (x)→ P (t)
)
for
some term t different from x. ⊓x
(
P (x)→ P (t)
)
, in turn, could only be derived by Rule A where, for some
variable y different from t, P (y) → P (t) is a (the) premise. The latter is an instable formula and does not
contain choice operators, so the only rule by which it can be derived is C, where the premise is p(y)→ p(t)
for some elementary letter p. Now we deal with a classically non-valid and hence instable elementary formula,
and it cannot be derived by any of the four rules of CL4.
Note that, in contrast, the “blind version” ∃y∀x
(
P (x)→ P (y)
)
of ⊔y⊓x
(
P (x)→ P (y)
)
is provable:
1. ∃y∀x
(
p(x)→ p(y)
)
(from {} by Rule A)
2. ∃y∀x
(
P (x)→ P (y)
)
(from 1 by Rule C)
‘There is y such that, for all x, P (x) → P (y)’ is true yet not in a constructive sense, thus belonging to
the kind of principles that have been fueling those endless and fruitless fights between the classically- and
constructivistically-minded. Computability logic is offering a peaceful settlement, telling the arguing parties:
“There is no need to fight at all. It appears that you simply have two different concepts of there is/for all.
So, why not also use two different names: ∃/∀ and ⊔/⊓. Yes, ∃y∀x
(
P (x) → P (y)
)
is indeed right; and
yes, ⊔y⊓x
(
P (x)→ P (y)
)
is indeed wrong.” Clauses 1 and 2 of Exercise 2.3 illustrate a similar solution for
excluded middle — the most typically attacked principle of classical logic.
The above-said remains true with p instead of P , for what was relevant there was the difference between
the constructive and non-constructive versions of logical operators rather than how atoms were understood.
Then how about the difference between the elementary and non-elementary versions of atoms? This dis-
tinction allows computability logic to again act in its noble role of a reconciliator/integrator, but this time
between classical and linear logics, telling them: “It appears that you have two different concepts of the
objects that logic is meant to study. So, why not also use two different sorts of atoms to represent such
objects: elementary atoms p, q, . . ., and general atoms P,Q, . . .. Yes, p → p ∧ p is indeed right; and yes,
P → P ∧ P (Exercise 2.3(4)) is indeed wrong”. However, the term “linear logic” in this context should be
understood in a very generous sense, referring not to the particular deductive system LL proposed by Girard
but rather to the general philosophy and intuitions traditionally associated with LL and some other, earlier-
but less-known, substructural logics. For, as pointed out in [2, 6, 3, 7, 8], computability logic considers
LL — with its multiplicatives seen as parallel operators and additives as choice operators — incomplete,
only partially agreeing with LL regarding what principles should be deemed wrong. An example of such
a principle is P ∧ P → P (Exercise 2.3(3)), accepted by CL4 but rejected by LL. This formula becomes
derivable if the weakening rule is added to LL, i.e. in the substructural logic in the past known under the
name BCK, and after the conception of LL more frequently referred to as the additive-multiplicative frag-
ment of affine logic. But just adding the weakening rule to LL is not sufficient to save the case. There are
CL4-provable formulas derivable in neither LL nor BCK.4 Clause 16 of Exercise 2.3 provides an example.
Another example is Blass’s [1] principle (P ∧Q) ∨ (R ∧ S)→ (P ∨R) ∧ (Q ∨ S).
Exercise 2.3 In clauses 12 and 13 below, “CL4 ⊢ E ⇔ F” stands for “CL4 ⊢ E → F and CL4 ⊢ F → E”.
Verify that:
1. CL4 ⊢ P ∨ ¬P .
2. CL4 6⊢ P ⊔ ¬P . Compare with 1.
3. CL4 ⊢ P ∧ P → P .
4While BCK is incomplete and hence so is affine logic as a conservatively extension of it, affine logic in its full additive-
multiplicative-exponential language has been proven ([8]) to be complete with respect to the semantics of computability logic.
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4. CL4 6⊢ P → P ∧ P . Compare with 3,5.
5. CL4 ⊢ P → P ⊓ P .
6. CL4 ⊢ (P ⊔Q) ∧ (P ⊔R)→ P ⊔ (Q ∧R). Remember the Go/Chess/Checkers example from Section 1.
7. CL4 6⊢ P ⊔ (Q ∧R)→ (P ⊔Q) ∧ (P ⊔R). Compare with 6,8.
8. CL4 ⊢ p ⊔ (Q ∧R)→ (p ⊔Q) ∧ (p ⊔R).
9. CL4 6⊢ p ⊓ (Q ∧R)→ (p ⊓Q) ∧ (p ⊓R). Compare with 8.
10. CL4 ⊢ ∀xP (x) →⊓xP (x).
11. CL4 6⊢⊓xP (x)→ ∀xP (x). Compare with 10.
12. CL4 ⊢ ∃xP (x) ⊓ ∃xQ(x)⇔ ∃x
(
P (x) ⊓Q(x)
)
. Similarly for ⊔ instead of ⊓, and/or ∀ instead of ∃.
13. CL4 ⊢⊓x∃yP (x, y)⇔ ∃y⊓xP (x, y). Similarly for ⊔ instead of ⊓, and/or ∀ instead of ∃.
14. CL4 ⊢ ∀ x
(
P (x) ∧Q(x)
)
→ ∀xP (x) ∧ ∀xQ(x).
15. CL4 6⊢⊓x
(
P (x) ∧Q(x)
)
→⊓xP (x) ∧⊓xQ(x). Compare with 14.
16. CL4 ⊢⊓x
((
P (x) ∧⊓xQ(x)
)
⊓
(
⊓xP (x) ∧Q(x)
))
→⊓xP (x) ∧⊓xQ(x).
Taking into account that classical validity and hence stability is recursively enumerable, the following
fact is obvious:
Fact 2.4 (The set of theorems of) CL4 is recursively enumerable.
In Section 6 we will also prove that
Theorem 2.5 The ∀,∃-free fragment of (the set of theorems of) CL4 is decidable.
The above theorem — just as the similar result for CL3 known from [6] — establishes a nice fact,
remarkably contrasting with the situation in classical logic: note that the ∀,∃-free fragment of CL4 is still
first-order as it contains the quantifiers⊓,⊔. This fragment is also natural as it gets rid of the only operators
of the language that produce games with imperfect information.
Next, based on the straightforward observation that elementary formulas are derivable in CL4 (in partic-
ular, from the empty set of premises by Rule A) exactly when they are classically valid and hence derivable
in classical predicate calculus, we have:
Fact 2.6 CL4 is a conservative extension of classical predicate logic: the latter is nothing but the elementary
fragment of the former.
The following main Theorem 2.7, even though by an order of magnitude more informative than Go¨del’s
completeness theorem for classical logic which it implies (by Fact 2.6) as a special case, is perhaps only one
of the first steps on the way of in-depth study of computability logic. Seeing what happens if we add the
recurrence group of operators (see Subsection 4.6 of [8]) to the language of CL4 remains a challenging but
worthy task for the future to pursue.
Theorem 2.7 CL4 ⊢ F iff F is valid (any formula F ). Furthermore:
Uniform-Constructive Soundness: There is an effective procedure that takes a CL4-proof of an
arbitrary formula F and constructs an HPM that wins F ∗ for every interpretation ∗.
Strong Completeness: If CL4 6⊢ F , then F ∗ is not computable for some interpretation ∗ that interprets
elementary letters as finitary predicates of arithmetical complexity ∆2, and interprets general letters as
⊓,⊔-combinations of finitary predicates of arithmetical complexity ∆2.
It was shown in [6] that the soundness/completeness result for CL3 implied a positive verification of
Conjectures 24.4, 25.4, 26.2 of [2] restricted to the language of that logic. For similar reasons, our Theorem
2.7 signifies a positive verification of those three conjectures restricted to the significantly more expressive
language of CL4. The rest of this paper — for the exception of the last three short sections — is devoted to a
proof of Theorem 2.7, which is nothing but a combination of Lemmas 4.1 (soundness) and 5.1 (completeness).
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3 Preliminaries
3.1 From formulas to hyperformulas
In the bottom-up (from conclusion to premises) view, Rule C introduces two occurrences of some new non-
logical elementary letter. For technical convenience, we want to differentiate elementary letters introduced
this way from all other elementary letters, and also to somehow keep track of the exact origin of each
such elementary letter q — that is, remember what general letter P was replaced by q when Rule C was
applied. For this purpose, we extend the language of CL4 by adding to it a new sort of non-logical letters
(correspondingly extending the scope of the common term “letter”) called hybrid. In particular, each n-ary
hybrid letter is a pair consisting of an n-ary general letter P , called its general component, and an n-ary
non-logical elementary letter q, called its elementary component. We denote such a pair by Pq. As we
are going to see later, the presence of Pq in a (modified CL4-) proof will be an indication of the fact that, in
the bottom-up view of proofs, q has been introduced by Rule C and that when this happened, the general
letter that q replaced was P .
In this new context, an atom— in particular, n-ary atom — is the expression L(t1, . . . , tn), where L is an
n-ary (elementary, general or hybrid) letter and the ti are any terms. We will often abbreviate such a tuple
t1, . . . , tn as ~t. The atom L(~t) is said to be L-based, and any two L-based atoms are said to be same-base.
An L-based atom is said to be elementary, general, hybrid, logical or non-logical iff the letter L is so. What
we call hyperformulas are defined in the same way as formulas, with the only difference that now atomic
expressions can be of any of the three (elementary, general or hybrid) sorts. “Subhyperformula” in the
context of hyperformulas will mean the same as “subformula” in the context of formulas. Our conventions
regarding the notation E[x1/t1, . . . , xn/tn], or representing formulas in the form E(x1, . . . , xn) and then
writing E(t1, . . . , tn) for E[x1/t1, . . . , xn/tn], extend from formulas to hyperformulas in the obvious way. So
do the concepts such as a surface (or positive, or negative) occurrence of a subexpression, a free (or bound, or
blindly bound) occurrence of a variable, etc. The concept of a free occurrence naturally extends to all terms
by stipulating that an occurrence of a constant in a hyperformula is always free. By a free variable of a
given hyperformula E we mean a variable that has at least one free occurrence in E. If there are no such
variables, then E is said to be closed.
A hyperformula E is said to be balanced iff, for every hybrid letter Pq occurring in E, the following
conditions are satisfied:
1. E has exactly two occurrences of Pq, where one occurrence is positive and the other occurrence is
negative, and both occurrences are surface occurrences;
2. The elementary letter q does not occur in E, nor is it the elementary component of any hybrid letter
occurring in E other than Pq.
An elementary hyperformula is one not containing ⊓, ⊔, ⊓ and ⊔, as well as general and hybrid
atoms. Thus, elementary hyperformula and elementary formula mean the same. The elementarization
‖E‖
of a hyperformula E is the result of replacing, in E, each surface occurrence of the form G1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Gn or
⊓xG by ⊤, each surface occurrence of the form G1 ⊔ . . .⊔Gn or ⊔xG by ⊥, every positive (resp. negative)
surface occurrence of each general atom by ⊥ (resp. ⊤), and every surface occurrence of each hybrid letter
by the elementary component of that letter. As in the case of formulas, we say that a hyperformula E is
stable iff ‖E‖ is valid in the classical sense; otherwise it is instable.
In our soundness proof for CL4 we will employ a “version” of CL4 called CL4◦. Unlike CL4 whose
language consists only of formulas, the language of CL4◦ allows any balanced hyperformulas. The rules of
CL4◦ are Rules A, B1 and B2 of CL4 — only now applied to any balanced hyperformulas rather than just
formulas — plus the following rule C◦ instead of C:
C◦ H 7→ E, where E is the result of replacing in H both occurrences of some hybrid letter Pq by its general
component P .
Lemma 3.1 For any formula F , if CL4 ⊢ F , then CL4◦ ⊢ F . Furthermore, there is an effective procedure
that converts any CL4-proof of any formula F into a CL4◦-proof of F .
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Idea. Every application of Rule C naturally turns into an application of Rule C◦.
Proof. Consider any CL4-proof tree for F , i.e. a tree every node of which is labeled with a formula that
follows by one of the rules of CL4 from (the labels of) its children, with F being the label of the root. By
abuse of terminology, here we identify the nodes of this tree with their labels, even though, of course, it may
be the case that different nodes have the same label. For each node E of the tree that is derived from its
child H by Rule C, — in particular, where H is the result of replacing in E a positive and a negative surface
occurrences of an n-ary general letter P by an n-ary non-logical elementary letter q, — do the following:
replace q by the hybrid letter Pq in H as well as in all of its descendants in the tree. It is not hard to see
that this way we will get a CL4◦-proof of F . ✷
LetE be a balanced hyperformula, and Pq an n-ary hybrid letter ofE with Pq(t1, . . . , tn) and Pq(t
′
1, . . . , t
′
n)
being the two Pq-based atoms occurring in E. We say that Pq is an unreasonable hybrid letter of E iff, for
some i with 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the occurrence of ti within Pq(t1, . . . , tn) and the occurrence of t′i within Pq(t
′
1, . . . , t
′
n)
are both free in E, and ti and t
′
i are (graphically) different terms. We say that a hyperformula is reason-
able iff it is balanced and does not have any unreasonable hybrid letters. And we say that a CL4◦-proof is
reasonable iff all of its hyperformulas are reasonable.
Intuitively, as will be seen shortly, the presence of unreasonable hyperformulas in a CL4◦-proof signifies
that some really “unreasonable” steps have been made in the proof. Specifically, in the bottom-up view, the
applications of Rule C◦ that introduced unreasonable hybrid letters were unnecessary, as the premise of such
an application is never any “more provable” (i.e. never has a shorter or simpler proof) than the conclusion.
Lemma 3.2 Assume E is a balanced hyperformula and Pq an unreasonable hybrid letter of E. Let F be the
result of replacing in E both of the occurrences of letter Pq by P . Then, if E is stable, so is F .
Idea. If Pq is unreasonable, due to the presence of two different free terms in the two q-based atoms of
‖E‖ such as, say, q(1, ~x) and q(2, ~y), these atoms can be treated as if they simply were atoms based on two
different letters, such as q1(~x) and q2(~y). Then q1(~x) and q2(~y) are fully isolated — not only from everything
else but also from each other — in the sense that each of the letters q1, q2 occurs only once in the formula.
It is known that in a classically valid formula such isolated atoms can be replaced by whatever formulas
without affecting validity. So, if ‖E‖ is valid, it will remain so after replacing in it q1(~x) by ⊥ and q2(~y)
by ⊤ (or vice versa, depending on which one is positive and which one is negative). The result of such a
replacement is exactly what ‖F‖ is.
Proof. Assume the conditions of the lemma. For simplicity, we may also assume that E is closed and hence
so is F . Indeed, otherwise, for every variable x, we can replace all free occurrences of x in these hyperformulas
by some constant not occurring in them, with different variables replaced by different constants. Obviously
this conversion would have no effect on being balanced, reasonable or stable.
Suppose F is instable, i.e., for some classical model M ,
‖F‖ is false in M . (1)
Our goal is to show that then E is instable, too. Let n be the arity of Pq, and assume that the two — positive
and negative — occurrences of Pq in E are within atoms Pq(t1, . . . , tn) and Pq(t
′
1, . . . , t
′
n), respectively. The
unreasonabity of Pq means that, for some i with 1 ≤ i ≤ n, neither the occurrence of ti within Pq(t1, . . . , tn)
nor the occurrence of t′i within Pq(t
′
1, . . . , t
′
n) is bound in E, and ti and t
′
i are different terms. Let us take a
note that these two terms are constants because, as we agreed, E has no free occurrences of variables.
Based on known facts from classical logic, we may assume that the universe of discourse of the above
model M is just the (countably infinite) set of our constants, and that each constant c is interpreted as
c itself. Also, unlike ‖E‖, ‖F‖ does not contain q, and therefore (1) will continue to hold under arbitrary
assumptions regarding how q is interpreted inM . So, an assumption we are making is that, for any constants
c1, . . . , cn, q(c1, . . . , ci−1, ti, ci+1, . . . , cn) is false in M and q(c1, . . . , ci−1, t
′
i, ci+1, . . . , cn) is true. Thus, in M ,
q(t1, . . . , tn) is equivalent (in the standard classical sense) to ⊥ and q(t′1, . . . , t
′
n) equivalent to ⊤. Observe that
‖F‖ is nothing but the result of replacing, in ‖E‖, the occurrence of q(t1, . . . , tn) by ⊥ and the occurrence of
q(t′1, . . . , t
′
n) by ⊤. Replacing subformulas by equivalent ones does not change the truth status of a formula.
So ‖E‖ has the same truth value in M as ‖F‖ does, i.e., by (1), is false. This means that E is instable. ✷
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Lemma 3.3 For any reasonable hyperformula F , if CL4◦ ⊢ F , then F has a reasonable CL4◦-proof.
Furthermore, there is an effective procedure that converts any CL4◦-proof of any reasonable hyperformula F
into a reasonable CL4◦-proof of F .
Idea. Given a CL4◦-proof of a reasonable hyperformula, mechanically disregard in it all of the “unreason-
able” applications of Rule C◦, i.e. the applications that (in the bottom-up view) introduced unreasonable
letters.
Proof. In the present context we prefer to see proofs as sequences rather than trees of hyperformulas.
For any balanced hyperformula E, let E˜ mean the result of replacing in E every (occurrence of) every
unreasonable hybrid letter by the general component of that letter.
Consider a CL4◦-proof P of a reasonable hyperformula F . We need to show how to (effectively) convert
P into a reasonable CL4◦-proof of F . Nothing is easier than to do such a conversion: just replace in P every
hyperformula E by E˜. We claim that the resulting sequence P˜ will be a reasonable CL4◦-proof of F .
Such a claim can be verified by showing that every hyperformula E˜ of P˜ follows by one of the rules of
CL4◦ from a (possibly empty) set of earlier hyperformulas of P˜. Indeed, assume E is derived in P from
{H1, . . . , Hn} by Rule A. This means that E is stable. Applying Lemma 3.2 as many times as the number of
unreasonable hybrid letters in E, we find that E˜ is also stable. Then, obviously, E˜ follows from {H˜1, . . . , H˜n}
by Rule A. In case E was derived in P from a premise H by Rule B1 or B2, evidently we again have that
E˜ follows from H˜ by the same rule. Suppose now E is derived in P from H by Rule C◦ — in particular,
H is the result of replacing in E two (positive and negative) surface occurrences of some general letter P by
a hybrid letter Pq. If Pq is not an unreasonable hybrid letter of H , it is obvious that E˜ follows from H˜ by
Rule C◦. Suppose now Pq is an unreasonable hybrid letter of H . Notice that then E˜ = H˜ ; since H occurs
in P earlier than E does, we may assume (by the induction hypothesis) that H˜ follows from some earlier
hyperformulas of P˜ by one of the rules. Hence, so does E˜. ✷
3.2 Interpretations of hyperformulas
By the general dehybridization of a hyperformula F we mean the formula that is the result of replacing
in F every hybrid letter by the general component of that letter. Where F is a hyperformula and G its
general dehybridization, we say that an interpretation ∗ is F -admissible iff it is G-admissible, and we
define the game F ∗ to be G∗. By the earlier definition, remembering that “problem”=“static game”, every
interpretation ∗ sends letters to static games, and it is known from [2] (Theorem 14.1) that all of our game
operations preserve the static property of games. So, the game F ∗ (any hyperformula F , any F -admissible
interpretation ∗) is always static. We will often implicitly rely on this fact in the present paper.
We say that two games A and B are equistructural iff LrAe = Lr
B
e for every valuation e.
Lemma 3.4 Assume F is a reasonable hyperformula containing an n-ary hybrid letter Pq,
∗ is an F -
admissible interpretation that interprets P as P ∗(x1, . . . , xn), and Pq(t1, . . . , tn) and Pq(t
′
1, . . . , t
′
n) are the
two Pq-based atoms occurring in F . Then the games P
∗(t1, . . . , tn) and P
∗(t′1, . . . , t
′
n) are equistructural.
Idea. Due to reasonability, P ∗(t1, . . . , tn) and P
∗(t′1, . . . , t
′
n) only differ from each other in terms that
are blindly bound (in at least one of the atoms). Condition (ii) of admissibility then guarantees that the
structures of the above two games (their Lr components) do not depend on the values of such terms.
Proof. Assume the conditions of the lemma. Without loss of generality and for convenience of repre-
sentation, let us also assume that, for some i (fix it) with 0 ≤ i ≤ n, we have t1 6= t′1, ..., ti 6= t
′
i and
ti+1 = t
′
i+1, ..., tn = t
′
n. So, we can rewrite the two Pq-based atoms of F as Pq(t1, . . . , ti, ti+1, . . . , tn)
and Pq(t
′
1, . . . , t
′
i, ti+1, . . . , tn). The reasonabity of F implies that, for each j with 1 ≤ j ≤ i, either the
occurrence of tj within Pq(t1, . . . , ti, ti+1, . . . , tn) or the occurrence of t
′
j within Pq(t
′
1, . . . , t
′
i, ti+1, . . . , tn) is
blindly bound in F and hence in its general dehybridization. In either case, by clause (ii) of Definition 2.1,
P ∗(x1, . . . , xi, xi+1, . . . , xn) is unistructural in xj . Thus,
P ∗(x1, . . . , xi, xi+1, . . . , xn) is unistructural in each of the variables x1, . . . , xi. (2)
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Pick any valuation e. Looking back at Definition 4.1 of [6], we find that LrP
∗(t1,...,ti,ti+1,...,tn)
e =
LrP
∗(x1,...,xi,xi+1,...,xn)
g and Lr
P∗(t′1,...,t
′
i,ti+1,...,tn)
e = Lr
P∗(x1,...,xi,xi+1,...,xn)
g′ , where g and g
′ are certain val-
uations that agree with e on all variables that are not among x1, . . . , xn, and agree with each other
on xi+1, . . . , xn. Thus, the only variables on which g and g
′ disagree can be x1, . . . , xi. But, by (2),
LrP
∗(x1,...,xn)
g does not depend on the value of g at x1, . . . , xi. Hence Lr
P∗(x1,...,xn)
g = Lr
P∗(x1,...,xn)
g′ , and
thus LrP
∗(t1,...,tn)
e = Lr
P∗(t′1,...,t
′
n)
e . Since e was arbitrary, we conclude that P
∗(t1, . . . , tn) and P
∗(t′1, . . . , t
′
n)
are equistructural. ✷
The concept of a perfect interpretation introduced in [6] naturally extends to the language of CL4:
an interpretation ∗ is perfect iff, for every (elementary or general) letter L, L∗ is a finitary game that
does not depend on any variables other than those from its canonical tuple. Next, for an interpretation
∗ and valuation e, the perfect interpretation induced by (∗, e) is the interpretation ⋆ that interprets
every n-ary (elementary or general) letter L as L⋆(x1, . . . , xn), where x1, . . . , xn is the canonical tuple
of L∗ and L⋆(x1, . . . , xn) is the game such that, for every tuple c1, . . . , cn of constants, L
⋆(c1, . . . , cn) =
e[L∗(c1, . . . , cn)]. Intuitively, L
⋆ is the “strictly n-ary version” of L∗, where the values of all variables that
are not in the canonical tuple are fixed to the constants assigned to those variables by e, so that L⋆, unlike
L∗, does not depend on any variables other than those from its canonical tuple, and ⋆ really is a perfect
interpretation.
Many of the other concepts and notational conventions of [6] extend to our present context in an even
more straightforward way and there is no need to officially redefine them. These include the notation fF
meaning the result of replacing in (hyper)formula F every free occurrence of every variable by the constant
which valuation f assigns to that variable.
The following three Lemmas 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7 can be proven in the same way as Lemmas 7.2, 7.3 and 7.7
of [6]: the fact that those dealt with CL3-formulas rather than hyperformulas is hardly of any relevance.
Lemma 3.5 Suppose x is a variable occurring in a hyperformula F . Then, for any (F -admissible) inter-
pretation ∗, constant c and subhyperformula G of F , (G[x/c])∗ = G∗[x/c].
Lemma 3.6 For any hyperformula F and (F -admissible) perfect interpretation ∗, the game F ∗ is (finitary
and) does not depend on any variables that do not occur free in F ; hence, if F is closed, F ∗ is a constant
game.
Lemma 3.7 For any hyperformula F , (F -admissible) interpretation ∗, and valuations e and f that agree
on all free variables of F , we have e[F ∗] = e[(fF )∗].
As we did in [6], with Lemma 3.6 in mind and in accordance with our conventions, as long as a hyper-
formula F is closed and an interpretation ∗ is perfect, we can always safely omit the irrelevant valuation
parameter e in WnF
∗
e , Lr
F∗
e or e[F
∗], and simply write WnF
∗
, LrF
∗
or F ∗.
The following fact, on which we often implicitly rely in this paper, was straightforward in the context of
CL3, but perhaps not quite so in our new context. A formal verification for it is given later in Section 8.
Fact 3.8 For any hyperformula F and valuation e, whenever an interpretation ∗ is F -admissible, so is the
perfect interpretation ⋆ induced by (∗, e).
Lemma 3.9 Assume F is a closed hyperformula, e any valuation, ∗ any F -admissible interpretation, and ⋆
the perfect interpretation induced by (∗, e). Then e[F ∗] = F ⋆.
Idea. When F is a closed atom, the effect e[F ∗] = F ⋆ is the very meaning of the perfect interpretation ⋆
induced by (∗, e). The same effect seamlessly extends from atoms to compound closed (hyper)formulas.
Proof. Let F , e, ∗, ⋆ be as above. We may assume that F does not contain hybrid atoms, for if it does,
replace F by its general dehybridization. Of course, ∗ remains admissible for every G that is a subformula
of F or the result of substituting in such a subformula some free occurrences of variables by constants. We
prove the lemma by induction on the complexity of F . If F is an atom, e[F ∗] = F ⋆ is immediate from
the definition of the perfect interpretation induced by (∗, e). And the cases when F is non-atomic with
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its main operator being among ¬,∧,∨,→,⊓,⊔ are also straightforward because e[. . .], ∗, ⋆ commute with
each of these operators. Finally, let F = QxG, where x is a variable and Q a quantifier. Consider an
arbitrary constant c. By Lemma 3.5, G∗[x/c] = (G[x/c])∗ and thus e[G∗[x/c]] = e[(G[x/c])∗]. But, by the
induction hypothesis, e[(G[x/c])∗] = (G[x/c])⋆. Hence e[G∗[x/c]] = (G[x/c])⋆. We can rewrite the same
as e[G∗[x/c]] = e[(G[x/c])⋆] because, by Lemma 3.6, (G[x/c])⋆ is a constant game. Again by Lemma 3.5,
(G[x/c])⋆ = G⋆[x/c], so that e[G∗[x/c]] = e[G⋆[x/c]]. Thus, for every constant c, e[G∗[x/c]] and e[G⋆[x/c]]
are the same. Now, examining the definitions of ∀,∃,⊓,⊔ (Section 4 of [6]) and seeing that e[QxA] only
depends on e[QxA[x/c]] for c ∈ {0, 1, . . .}, we find e[QxG∗] = e[QxG⋆], i.e. e[F ∗] = e[F ⋆]. Again, since F ⋆
is a constant game, e[F ⋆] can be rewritten as F ⋆, concluding that e[F ∗] = F ⋆. ✷
3.3 Prefixation lemmas
For a game A, we will be using the expression LRA to denote the set of all unilegal runs of A, i.e.
LRA = {Γ | Γ ∈ LrAe for every valualuation e}.
Remember the notations Γγ , ¬Γ and 〈Φ〉A (the Φ-prefixation of A) from [6]. The game 〈Φ〉A — which in
this paper we may sometimes also write just as ΦA — is defined if and only if Φ ∈ LRA. For readability
and compactness of formulations, let us agree that:
Convention 3.10 Every time we write 〈Φ〉A, we implicitly claim that this game is defined, i.e. Φ ∈ LRA.
Lemma 3.11 Let A,A1, . . . , An (n ≥ 2) be any games, x any variable, and Φ any position. For each of the
following clauses, we (explicitly) assume that Φ is a unilegal position of the game to which Φ-prefixation is
applied; for clause 3 we also assume that A is x-unistructural. Then:
1. 〈Φ〉¬A = ¬(〈¬Φ〉A).
2. 〈Φ〉(A1 ∨ . . . ∨An) = 〈Φ1.〉A1 ∨ . . . ∨ 〈Φn.〉An.
3. 〈Φ〉∃xA = ∃x〈Φ〉A.
Proof. Clauses 1, 2 and 3 of this lemma can be easily proven by induction on the length of Φ based on
clauses 1, 3 and 10 of Lemma 4.7 of [6], respectively, with inductive steps relying on the obvious fact that
〈Φ, ℘α〉B = 〈℘α〉(〈Φ〉B) (see the footnote on page 24). Officially, clauses 1 and 2 have been verified in [5]
(Lemmas 3.5 and 3.6), and the fact stated in clause 3 has been observed in Section 11 of [2] (equation (8)
and the subsequent remark). ✷
By a choice hyperformula we mean a non-atomic hyperformula whose main operator is ⊓,⊔,⊓ or
⊔; depending on that operator, we may more specifically refer to such a hyperformula as a ⊓- ⊔-, ⊓- or
⊔-hyperformula. Henceforth we usually only deal with balanced (in fact, reasonable) hyperformulas, and
their subhyperformulas that are choice hyperformulas are always simply formulas. However, for uniformity,
we will still typically say “choice (⊓-, etc.) hyperformula” rather than “choice (⊓-, etc.) formula”.
A quasiatom of a hyperformula E is a surface occurrence of a subhyperformula in E that is either an atom
(of any of the three sorts) or a choice hyperformula. Note that a quasiatom is not just a subhyperformula
but rather a subhyperformula together with a particular occurrence. E.g., in P ∧ P , the two different
occurrences of P present two different quasiatoms. However, for readability (and by abuse of concepts), we
will often identify a quasiatom with the corresponding hyperformula G, and simply say “the quasiatom G”
once it is clear from the context which of the possibly many occurrences of G we mean. A quasiatom G of
a hyperformula E is said to be positive (resp. negative) iff its occurrence in E is positive (resp. negative).
Similarly, such a quasiatom G is elementary, general, hybrid or choice iff it is an elementary atom, general
atom, hybrid atom, or choice hyperformula, respectively. Likewise for other terms such as n-ary, L-based,
same-base etc. A non-elementary (non-choice, etc.) quasiatom means a quasiatom that is not an elementary
(choice, etc.) one.
In Section 7 of [6] we defined the noun “E-specification” and the corresponding verb “to E-specify”,
with E being a CL3-formula, specified objects being surface occurrences of its subformulas, and their E-
specifications being strings acting as sorts of addresses of those occurrences/subformulas in the parse tree
for the (∨,∧,→)-structure of E. This terminology straightforwardly extends to our new context where
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E can be any hyperformula and E-specified objects be any surface occurrences of its subhyperformulas,
including quasiatoms. Further extending it from quasiatoms to letters, the E-specification of a given surface
occurrence of a letter L means the E-specification of the (non-choice) quasiatom in which that occurrence
of L happens to be. For a hyperformula or letter G, we can say “the occurrence γ of G in E” to mean the
surface occurrence of G in E that is E-specified by γ. Note that while a given string γ can E-specify the
surface occurrence of more than one subhyperformula, the quasiatom or letter E-specified by γ is always
unique. E.g., when E = Q ∧ ¬P (x), two subformulas and one letter of E are E-specified by ‘2.’: ¬P , P (x)
and P ; however, out of these three expressions, only the second one is a quasiatom and only the third one
is a letter. So, quasiatoms and surface occurrences of letters of a given hyperformula E can be uniquely
identified by their E-specifications.
Where Γ is a run, E a hyperformula, G a quasiatom of E and γ its E-specification, we define ΓγE by:
ΓγE =
{
Γγ if G is positive in E;
¬Γγ if G is negative in E.
By the surface complexity of a hyperformula E we mean the number of surface occurrences of ¬, ∧,
∨, →, ∀, ∃ in E. A couple of forthcoming lemmas will be proven by induction on surface complexity. In the
inductive steps of such proofs, we will only consider the cases when the main operator is ¬, ∨ or ∃. The cases
with ∧, → and ∀ can be safely omitted, as these three operators can be considered standard abbreviations
in terms of ¬, ∨ and ∃.
According to our earlier conventions from [6], below and elsewhere ℘ ranges over {⊤,⊥}.
Lemma 3.12 For any hyperformula E, E-admissible interpretation ∗ and run Γ, Γ ∈ LRE
∗
iff every
labmove of Γ has the form ℘γβ for some γ that E-specifies a non-elementary quasiatom G of E, such that
ΓγE ∈ LR
G∗ .
Idea. The meaning of the above lemma is that a unilegal run of the game represented by a hyperformula
E consists of unilegal runs of the games represented by the quasiatoms of E, with the roles of the two
players switched in negative quasiatoms. This is in concordance with the intuition — explained in [6] —
that (uni)legal runs of (¬,∨,∧,→,∃,∀)-combinations of games are nothing but interspersed (uni)legal runs
of the component games, with ¬ and → (in its antecedent) switching players’ roles. The lemma only talks
about non-elementary quasiatoms, because elementary quasiatoms represent games without legal moves, and
a legal run of a compound game would never include any moves made in elementary components of the game.
Proof. We prove Lemma 3.12 by induction on the surface complexity of E. For the basis of induction,
assume E is a quasiatom. If E is an elementary quasiatom and hence E∗ is an elementary game, then
Γ ∈ LRE
∗
iff Γ = 〈〉, because, as we remember, 〈〉 is the only legal run of elementary games. And, since
in this case E has no non-elementary quasiatoms, the statement of the lemma is vacuously true. Suppose
now E is a non-elementary quasiatom. The occurrence of E in itself is E-specified by the empty string ǫ.
Inserting ǫ does not change a string, so every labmove ℘β of Γ has the form ℘ǫβ. And, of course, ΓǫE = Γ.
Therefore, again, what the lemma claims is trivially true.
For the inductive step, assume E = ¬K. By the definition of ¬, Γ ∈ LRE
∗
iff ¬Γ ∈ LRK
∗
. In turn, by
the induction hypothesis, ¬Γ ∈ LRK
∗
iff every labmove of ¬Γ has the form ℘γβ for some γ that K-specifies
a non-elementary quasiatom G of K, such that (¬Γ)γK ∈ LR
G∗ . But notice that the same γ also E-specifies
the same quasiatom G, and that (¬Γ)γK = Γ
γ
E . Hence, the statement of the lemma is correct.
Next, assume E = K1∨. . .∨Kn. By the definition of ∨, Γ ∈ LR
E∗ iff every labmove of Γ has the form ℘i.α
for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and, for each such i, Γi. ∈ LRK
∗
i . In turn, by the induction hypothesis, Γi. ∈ LRK
∗
i
iff every labmove of Γi. has the form ℘δβ for some δ that Ki-specifies a non-elementary quasiatom G of Ki,
such that (Γi.)δKi ∈ LR
G∗ . Notice that the same G is a quasiatom of E which is E-specified by i.δ, and that
(Γi.)δKi = Γ
i.δ
E . Thus, Γ ∈ LR
E∗ iff every labmove of Γ has the form ℘i.δβ, where i.δ is the E-specification
of a non-elementary quasiatom G of E, such that Γi.δE ∈ LR
G∗ . In other words, with i.δ in the role of γ, the
statement of the lemma holds.
Finally, assume E = ∃xK. Taking into account that every quasiatom of ∃xK is also a quasiatom of K
(and vice versa) with the same specification and same positive/negative status, this case is straightforward
because, by the definition of ∃, LR∃xK
∗
= LRK
∗
. ✷
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For a run Γ and string γ, we will be using the expression
Γ−γ
to denote the result of deleting in Γ every labmove of the form ℘γβ.
Lemma 3.13 Assume E,F are hyperformulas, G is a quasiatom of E, and H is the result of replacing this
quasiatom by F in E. Further assume γ is the E-specification of G, ∗ is an interpretation admissible for
both E and H, and Φ is a unilegal position of E∗ with 〈ΦγE〉G
∗ = F ∗. Then 〈Φ〉E∗ = 〈Φ−γ〉H∗.
Idea. Let us look at an example with Φ = 〈⊥1.2,⊤2.1〉. The effect of playing Φ in game (A ⊓B) ∨ (C ⊔D)
is obviously B∨C, in the sense that 〈Φ〉
(
(A⊓B)∨ (C ⊔D)
)
= B∨C. But the same effect is achieved by just
playing 〈⊤2.1〉 in B∨(C⊔D). This is so because 〈⊤2.1〉 is the result of deleting from Φ the move(s) “meant”
for the A ⊓ B component of the game, and B is the result of making those very moves in A ⊓ B. Thus,
Φ can be replaced by 〈⊤2.1〉 provided that we also replace A ⊓ B by B. One may guess that phenomena
such as the just-observed 〈⊥1.2,⊤2.1〉
(
(A ⊓B) ∨ (C ⊔D)
)
= 〈⊤2.1〉
(
B ∨ (C ⊔D)
)
are no accident, and this
is exactly what Lemma 3.13 asserts. In our example, identifying formulas with their interpretations, E is
(A ⊓B) ∨ (C ⊔D), F is B, G is A ⊓B, H is B ∨ (C ⊔D), and γ is ‘1.’.
Proof. Assume the conditions of the lemma. We proceed by induction on the surface complexity of E.
For the basis, assume E is a quasiatom, so that G = E, H = F , and γ is the empty string ǫ. According
to one of the assumptions of the lemma, 〈ΦǫE〉G
∗ = F ∗. Hence, as ΦǫE = Φ, we have 〈Φ〉G
∗ = F ∗. The
equations G = E and H = F allow us to rewrite 〈Φ〉G∗ = F ∗ as 〈Φ〉E∗ = H∗. Of course H∗ = 〈〉H∗, and
thus 〈Φ〉E∗ = 〈〉H∗. But notice that 〈〉 = 〈Φ−ǫ〉, which yields the desired 〈Φ〉E∗ = 〈Φ−ǫ〉H∗.
Next, assume E = ¬K. As in the corresponding step of our proof of Lemma 3.12, γ remains the K-
specification of G, and ΦγE = (¬Φ)
γ
K . Also, ¬Φ ∈ LR
K∗ . It is our assumption that 〈ΦγE〉G
∗ = F ∗, and
therefore 〈(¬Φ)γK 〉G
∗ = F ∗. Then, by the induction hypothesis, 〈¬Φ〉K∗ = 〈(¬Φ)−γ〉L∗, where L is the result
of replacing G by F in K. Hence ¬(〈¬Φ〉K∗) = ¬(〈(¬Φ)−γ 〉L∗). By Lemma 3.11(1), ¬(〈¬Φ〉K∗) = 〈Φ〉E∗
and ¬(〈(¬Φ)−γ 〉L∗) = 〈Φ−γ〉¬L∗. Consequently, 〈Φ〉E∗ = 〈Φ−γ〉¬L∗. But, of course, ¬L∗ = H∗. Thus,
〈Φ〉E∗ = 〈Φ−γ〉H∗.
Now, assume
E = K1 ∨K2 ∨ . . . ∨Kn.
Then, by Lemma 3.11(2),
〈Φ〉E∗ = 〈Φ1.〉K∗1 ∨ 〈Φ
2.〉K∗2 ∨ . . . ∨ 〈Φ
n.〉K∗n. (3)
Let Ki be the disjunct of E that contains G, and let δ be the Ki-specification of G. For simplicity of
representation and without loss of generality, let us assume here that i = 1. Thus, γ = 1.δ, and we have
H = L ∨K2 ∨ . . . ∨Kn, (4)
where L is the result of replacing G by F in K1. As γ = 1.δ, for any j 6= 1 we obviously have Φj. = (Φ−γ)j..
Hence, (3) can be rewritten as
〈Φ〉E∗ = 〈Φ1.〉K∗1 ∨ 〈(Φ
−γ)2.〉K∗2 ∨ . . . ∨ 〈(Φ
−γ)n.〉K∗n. (5)
It is our assumption that 〈ΦγE〉G
∗ = F ∗, i.e. 〈Φ1.δE 〉G
∗ = F ∗. But obviously Φ1.δE = (Φ
1.)δK1 , and therefore
〈(Φ1.)δK1〉G
∗ = F ∗. Then, by the induction hypothesis, 〈Φ1.〉K∗1 = 〈(Φ
1.)−δ〉L∗. But it is not hard to see
that (Φ1.)−δ = (Φ−1.δ)1.. Hence, 〈Φ1.〉K∗1 = 〈(Φ
−1.δ)1.〉L∗, i.e. 〈Φ1.〉K∗1 = 〈(Φ
−γ)1.〉L∗. This allows us to
rewrite (5) as
〈Φ〉E∗ = 〈(Φ−γ)1.〉L∗ ∨ 〈(Φ−γ)2.〉K∗2 ∨ . . . ∨ 〈(Φ
−γ)n.〉K∗n. (6)
Since Φ ∈ LRE
∗
, every move of (Φ and hence of) Φ−γ starts with ‘i.’ for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. And, with
Convention 3.10 in mind, (6) implies that
(Φ−γ)1. ∈ LRL
∗
, (Φ−γ)2. ∈ LRK
∗
2 , . . . , (Φ−γ)n. ∈ LRK
∗
n .
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By the definition of ∨, all this means that Φ−γ ∈ LRL
∗∨K∗2∨...∨K
∗
n . Then, by Lemma 3.11(2),
〈Φ−γ〉(L∗ ∨K∗2 ∨ . . . ∨K
∗
n) = 〈(Φ
−γ)1.〉L∗ ∨ 〈(Φ−γ)2.〉K∗2 ∨ . . . ∨ 〈(Φ
−γ)n.〉K∗n.
The above, in conjunction with (6) and (4), yields the desired 〈Φ〉E∗ = 〈Φ−γ〉H∗.
Finally, in view of Lemma 3.11(3), the case E = ∃xK is rather straightforward. This is so because
LR∃xK
∗
= LRK
∗
and, as pointed out in our proof of Lemma 3.12, every quasiatom of ∃xK is also a
quasiatom of K (and vice versa) with the same specification and same positive/negative status. ✷
3.4 Manageability
Definition 3.14 Let E be a reasonable hyperformula. We say that a run Γ is E-manageable iff:
1. Every labmove of Γ has the form ℘γα, where γ E-specifies either a general or hybrid quasiatom.
2. Whenever π is the E-specification of a positive hybrid quasiatom and ν is the E-specification of the
same-base negative hybrid quasiatom, Γπ is a ⊤-delay of ¬Γν .
3. Whenever γ is the E-specification of a general quasiatom, Γγ contains no ⊤-labeled moves.
The above concept will play a central role in our soundness proof for CL4, with manageability being
a certain nice property helping ⊤ to succeed. In rough intuitive terms, condition 1 means that the play
has only been taking place in atoms, so that the logical structure of the game has not been affected, and
it continues to be precisely described by E. Condition 2 ensures that the (sub)plays in the “matched”
occurrences of atoms are in a sense symmetric, so that a win in at least one of them is guaranteed. And
condition 3 signifies that ⊤ has not made any hasty moves in unmatched atoms, so that, if and when at
some later point such an atom finds a match, by copying its adversary’s moves, ⊤ will still have a chance to
even out the corresponding two subplays.
Lemma 3.15 Assume E is a reasonable hyperformula, ∗ an E-admissible interpretation, and Γ an infinite
run with arbitrarily long finite initial segments that are E-manageable unilegal positions of E∗. Then Γ is
an E-manageable unilegal run of E∗.
Proof. Assume the conditions of the lemma. By condition (a) of Definition 2.1 of [6], Γ is in LRE
∗
because it has arbitrarily long initial segments that are in LRE
∗
. And obviously Γ satisfies conditions 1 and
3 of Definition 3.14 because it has arbitrarily long initial segments that satisfy those conditions. So, what
remains to show is that Γ also satisfies condition 2. Suppose, for a contradiction, that π and ν are as in
condition 2 but Γπ is not a ⊤-delay of ¬Γν . This means that at least one of the following two statements is
true:
(i) For one of the players ℘, the subsequence of the ℘-labeled moves of Γπ (i.e. the result of deleting in Γπ
all ¬℘-labeled moves) is not the same as that of ¬Γν , or
(ii) For some k, n, in ¬Γν the nth ⊤-labeled move is made later than the kth ⊥-labeled move, but in Γπ
the nth ⊤-labeled move is made earlier than the kth ⊥-labeled move.
Whether (i) or (ii) is the case, it is not hard to see that, beginning from some (finite) m, every initial
segment Ψ of Γ of length ≥ m will satisfy the same (i) or (ii) in the role of Γ, and hence Ψ will not be an
E-manageable position of E∗. This contradicts the assumptions of our lemma. ✷
Lemma 3.16 Assume E is a reasonable hyperformula, ∗ an E-admissible interpretation, and Ω an E-
manageable unilegal position of E∗. Suppose γ is the E-specification of a negative (resp. positive) quasiatom
G1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Gn (resp. G1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Gn), and i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Let H be the result of replacing in E the above
quasiatom by Gi. Then:
1. Ω is H-manageable;
2. 〈Ω,⊤γi〉E∗ = 〈Ω〉H∗.
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Proof. Assume the conditions of the lemma. It is not hard to see that, with Ω in the role of Γ, each
of the thee conditions of Definition 3.14 is inherited by H from E. This takes care of clause 1. Since Ω
does not contain γ-prefixed moves (for, otherwise, by condition 1 of Definition 3.14, it would not be E-
manageable), we have 〈Ω,⊤γi〉γ = 〈⊤i〉 and 〈Ω,⊤γi〉−γ = Ω. By clause 5 (resp. 6) of Lemma 4.7 of [6],
the fact 〈Ω,⊤γi〉γ = 〈⊤i〉 implies 〈Ω,⊤γi〉γE(G1 ⊓ . . . ⊓Gn)
∗ = G∗i (resp. 〈Ω,⊤γi〉
γ
E(G1 ⊔ . . . ⊔Gn)
∗ = G∗i );
and Lemma 3.12 guarantees 〈Ω,⊤γi〉 ∈ LRE
∗
. Then, by Lemma 3.13, the fact 〈Ω,⊤γi〉−γ = Ω implies
〈Ω,⊤γi〉E∗ = 〈Ω〉H∗. This proves clause 2. ✷
Lemma 3.17 Assume E is a reasonable hyperformula, ∗ an E-admissible interpretation, and Ω an E-
manageable unilegal position of E∗. Suppose γ is the E-specification of a negative (resp. positive) quasiatom
⊓xG(x) (resp. ⊔xG(x)), and c is any constant. Let H be the result of replacing in E the above quasiatom
by G(c). Then:
1. Ω is H-manageable;
2. 〈Ω,⊤γc〉E∗ = 〈Ω〉H∗.
Proof. This lemma is very similar to the previous one. The only difference in the proof would be that,
when claiming 〈Ω,⊤γc〉γE
(
⊓xG(x)
)∗
=
(
G(c)
)∗
(resp. 〈Ω,⊤γc〉γE
(
⊔xG(x)
)∗
=
(
G(c)
)∗
), we would need to
rely on clause 7 (resp. 8) of Lemma 4.7 of [6] in conjunction with Lemma 3.5. ✷
Lemma 3.18 Assume A is a static game, e is any valuation, and Γ,∆ are runs such that ∆ is a ⊤-delay
of Γ. Then:
1. If ∆ is a ⊤-illegal run of e[A], then so is Γ.
2. If Γ is a ⊥-illegal run of e[A], then so is ∆.
Proof. The above is a fact known from [2] (Lemma 4.7). ✷
Lemma 3.19 Assume E is a reasonable hyperformula, ∗ an E-admissible interpretation, and Ω an E-
manageable unilegal position of E∗. Suppose H is the hyperformula that results from E by replacing in it a
positive surface occurrence π and a negative surface occurrence ν of a general letter P by a hybrid letter Pq,
such that H remains reasonable. Further assume Ωπ = 〈⊥π1, . . . ,⊥πn〉 and Ων = 〈⊥ν1, . . . ,⊥νm〉. Then
〈Ω,⊤πν1, . . . ,⊤πνm,⊤νπ1, . . . ,⊤νπn〉 is an H-manageable unilegal position of H∗.
Proof. Assume the conditions of the lemma. Let
Φ = 〈Ω,⊤πν1, . . . ,⊤πνm,⊤νπ1, . . . ,⊤νπn〉.
Notice that
ΦπH = Φ
π = 〈⊥π1, . . . ,⊥πn,⊤ν1, . . . ,⊤νm〉 (7)
and
ΦνH = ¬Φ
ν = 〈⊤ν1, . . . ,⊤νm,⊥π1, . . . ,⊥πn〉. (8)
As we see,
ΦπH is a ⊤-delay of Φ
ν
H . (9)
This implies that Φ is H-manageable, because conditions 1 and 3 of Definition 3.14 are obviously inherited
by H and Φ from E and Ω, and so is condition 2 for any relevant pair (π′, ν′) different from (π, ν).
What remains to show is that Φ ∈ LRH
∗
. For this, in view of Lemma 3.12, it would be sufficient to
verify that ΦπH ∈ LR
P∗(~t) and ΦνH ∈ LR
P∗(~t′), where Pq(~t) and Pq(~t′) are the two — respectively positive
and negative — Pq-based atoms of E. This is sufficient because for any other (different from π, ν) relevant
γ, the similar condition is inherited by H and Φ from E and Ω as we have Φγ = Ωγ .
Since Ω ∈ LRE
∗
, by Lemma 3.12 we have both ΩπE ∈ LR
P∗(~t) and ΩνE ∈ LR
P∗(~t′). Thus,
〈⊥π1, . . . ,⊥πn〉 ∈ LR
P∗(~t); (10)
〈⊤ν1, . . . ,⊤νm〉 ∈ LR
P∗(~t′). (11)
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Suppose ΦπH 6∈ LR
P∗(~t), i.e., for some valuation e, ΦπH 6∈ Lr
P∗(~t)
e = Lr
e[P∗(~t)]. By (7), this can be rewritten
as 〈⊥π1, . . . ,⊥πn,⊤ν1, . . . ,⊤νm〉 6∈ Lr
e[P∗(~t)]. In view of (10), ΦπH cannot be a ⊥-illegal position of e[P
∗(~t)].
So, it must be ⊤-illegal. But then, by (9) and Lemma 3.18(1), ΦνH is a ⊤-illegal position of e[P
∗(~t)]. Hence,
by Lemma 3.4, ΦνH is a ⊤-illegal position of e[P
∗(~t′)]. This, however, is in obvious contradiction with (8)
and (11).
Suppose now ΦνH 6∈ LR
P∗(~t′), i.e. ΦνH 6∈ Lr
e[P∗(~t′)] for some valuation e. This case is similar/symmetric
to the previous one. By (8) and (11), ΦνH cannot be a ⊤-illegal position of e[P
∗(~t′)]. So, it must be ⊥-illegal.
But then, by (9) and Lemma 3.18(2), ΦπH is a ⊥-illegal position of e[P
∗(~t′)] and hence (by Lemma 3.4) of
e[P ∗(~t)]. This is in contradiction with (7) and (10). ✷
Lemma 3.20 Assume E is a reasonable hyperformula, α is any move, ∗ is an E-admissible interpretation,
Ω is an E-manageable position, and 〈Ω,⊥α〉 ∈ LRE
∗
. Then one of the following conditions is satisfied:
(i) α = γβ, where γ is the E-specification of a general quasiatom. In this case 〈Ω,⊥α〉 is an E-
manageable unilegal position of E∗.
(ii) α = γβ, where γ is the E-specification of a hybrid quasiatom. Let σ be the E-specification of the
other same-base hybrid quasiatom. Then 〈Ω,⊥γβ,⊤σβ〉 is an E-manageable unilegal position of E∗.
(iii) α = γi, where γ is the E-specification of a positive (resp. negative) quasiatom G1 ⊓ . . .⊓Gn (resp.
G1 ⊔ . . . ⊔Gn) and i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. In this case, where H is the result of replacing in E the above quasiatom
by Gi, we have:
1. Ω is H-manageable;
2. 〈Ω,⊥α〉E∗ = 〈Ω〉H∗.
(iv) α = γc, where γ is the E-specification of a positive (resp. negative) quasiatom ⊓xG(x) (resp.
⊔xG(x)) and c is a constant. In this case, where H is the result of replacing in E the above quasiatom by
G(c), we have:
1. Ω is H-manageable;
2. 〈Ω,⊥α〉E∗ = 〈Ω〉H∗.
Proof. Assume E, α, ∗, Ω are as the first sentence of the lemma stipulates. By Lemma 3.12, the condition
〈Ω,⊥α〉 ∈ LRE
∗
implies that α should be γβ, where γ is a E-specification of a non-elementary quasiatom
F of E. Fix these γ, β and F . As a non-elementary quasiatom, F should be either (i) a general atom, or
(ii) a hybrid atom, or (iii) a ⊓- or ⊔-(hyper)formula, or (iv) a ⊓- or ⊔-(hyper)formula. We consider each of
these four possibilities — corresponding to the four conditions (i)-(iv) of the lemma — separately.
Case (i): F is a general atom. Obviously adding to a E-manageable position (Ω) a ⊥-labeled move whose
prefix E-specifies a general quasiatom again yields an E-manageable position. So, 〈Ω,⊥α〉 is E-manageable;
by the assumptions of the lemma, it is also a unilegal position of E∗. Thus, condition (i) of Lemma 3.20 is
satisfied.
Case (ii): F is a hybrid atom Pq(~t). Let Pq(~t′) be the other Pq-based quasiatom of E and σ its E-
specification, so that γ, σ are as in (the condition of) condition (ii) of the lemma. We want to show that
then the rest of that condition is also satisfied, i.e. that 〈Ω,⊥γβ,⊤σβ〉 is an E-manageable unilegal position
of E∗.
Subcase (ii).1: Assume Pq(~t) is negative in E and Pq(~t′) is positive. Since Ω is E-manageable, Ω
σ is a
⊤-delay of ¬Ωγ . Therefore 〈Ωσ,⊤β〉 is a ⊤-delay of 〈¬Ωγ ,⊤β〉, i.e. of ¬〈Ωγ ,⊥β〉. From here, observing that
〈Ωσ,⊤β〉 = 〈Ω,⊥γβ,⊤σβ〉σ and 〈Ωγ ,⊥β〉 = 〈Ω,⊥γβ,⊤σβ〉γ , we get:
〈Ω,⊥γβ,⊤σβ〉σ is a ⊤-delay of ¬〈Ω,⊥γβ,⊤σβ〉γ . (12)
Remembering the assumption that Ω is E-manageable and taking into account that for any relevant δ 6= γ, σ
we have 〈Ω,⊥γβ,⊤σβ〉δ = Ωδ, (12) is obviously sufficient to conclude that
〈Ω,⊥γβ,⊤σβ〉 is E-manageable. (13)
According to the assumptions of the lemma, 〈Ω,⊥γβ〉 ∈ LRE
∗
. By Lemma 3.12, this implies that
〈Ω,⊥γβ〉γE ∈ LR
P∗(~t), i.e. ¬〈Ω,⊥γβ〉γ ∈ LRP
∗(~t). But ¬〈Ω,⊥γβ〉γ = ¬〈Ω,⊥γβ,⊤σβ〉γ because γ 6= σ.
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Thus, ¬〈Ω,⊥γβ,⊤σβ〉γ ∈ LRP
∗(~t). Then, by (12) and Lemma 3.18(1), 〈Ω,⊥γβ,⊤σβ〉σ is not a ⊤-illegal
position of e[P ∗(~t)] (whatever valuation e) and hence — by Lemma 3.4 — of e[P ∗(~t′)]. It is not a ⊥-illegal
position of e[P ∗(~t′)] either, for otherwise we would have 〈Ω,⊥γβ〉σ 6∈ LRP
∗(~t′) which, in view of Lemma 3.12,
contradicts our assumption that 〈Ω,⊥γβ〉 ∈ LRE
∗
. Thus, 〈Ω,⊥γβ,⊤σβ〉σ ∈ LRP
∗(~t′). Now, taking into
account that for any δ 6= σ that E-specifies a quasiatom of E we clearly have 〈Ω,⊥γβ,⊤σβ〉δ = 〈Ω,⊥γβ〉δ,
Lemma 3.12 in conjunction with our assumption 〈Ω,⊥γβ〉 ∈ LRE
∗
implies that 〈Ω,⊥γβ,⊤σβ〉 ∈ LRE
∗
.
This, together with (13), means that condition (ii) of Lemma 3.20 is satisfied.
Subcase (ii).2: Now assume Pq(~t) is positive in E and Pq(~t′) is negative. By the E-manageability of Ω,
Ωγ is a ⊤-delay of ¬Ωσ, whence 〈Ωγ ,⊥β〉 is a ⊤-delay of 〈¬Ωσ ,⊥β〉 = ¬〈Ωσ ,⊤β〉. Then, as 〈Ωγ ,⊥β〉 =
〈Ω,⊥γβ,⊤σβ〉γ and 〈Ωσ,⊤β〉 = 〈Ω,⊥γβ,⊤σβ〉σ, we get:
〈Ω,⊥γβ,⊤σβ〉γ is a ⊤-delay of ¬〈Ω,⊥γβ,⊤σβ〉σ. (14)
From here, just as from (12) in Subcase (ii).1, we can conclude that statement (13) is true.
Next, as noted in Subcase (ii).1, 〈Ω,⊥γβ〉γE ∈ LR
P∗(~t), which now simply means that 〈Ω,⊥γβ〉γ ∈
LRP
∗(~t). Then 〈Ω,⊥γβ,⊤σβ〉γ , which equals 〈Ω,⊥γβ〉γ , is not a ⊥-illegal position of e[P ∗(~t)] (whatever
valuation e). Therefore, by (14) and Lemma 3.18(2), ¬〈Ω,⊥γβ,⊤σβ〉σ is not a ⊥-illegal position of e[P ∗(~t)]
and hence, by Lemma 3.4, of e[P ∗(~t′)]. But ¬〈Ω,⊥γβ,⊤σβ〉σ, being equal to 〈¬Ω,⊤γβ,⊥σβ〉σ , is not a
⊤-illegal position of e[P ∗(~t′)], either, for otherwise we would have 〈¬Ω,⊤γβ〉σ 6∈ LRP
∗(~t′), i.e. ¬〈Ω,⊥γβ〉σ 6∈
LRP
∗(~t′), i.e. 〈Ω,⊥γβ〉σE 6∈ LR
P∗(~t′), and this, by Lemma 3.12, contradicts our assumption that 〈Ω,⊥γβ〉 ∈
LRE
∗
. Thus, 〈Ω,⊥γβ,⊤σβ〉σ ∈ LRP
∗
(~t′). From here, as in Subcase (ii).1, we can conclude that condition
(ii) of Lemma 3.20 is satisfied.
Case (iii): F is G1 ⊓ . . . ⊓Gn or G1 ⊔ . . . ⊔Gn. We want to show that then (the rest of) condition (iii)
of Lemma 3.20 is satisfied. Since Ω is E-manageable, clause 1 of Definition 3.14 implies that Ω does not
contain γ-prefixed moves. Therefore we have:
〈Ω,⊥γβ〉γ = 〈⊥γβ〉γ ; (15)
〈Ω,⊥γβ〉−γ = Ω. (16)
By (15) and Lemma 3.12, 〈⊥γβ〉γE ∈ LR
F∗ . In view of clauses 5(a) and 6(a) of Lemma 4.7 of [6], this is the
case when β = i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and either F = G1 ⊓ . . .⊓Gn and F is positive in E (so that 〈⊥γβ〉
γ
E = 〈⊥i〉),
or F = G1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Gn and F is negative in E (so that 〈⊥γβ〉
γ
E = 〈⊤i〉). In either case, by clauses 5(b)
and 6(b) of the same lemma, we have 〈⊥γβ〉γEF
∗ = G∗i . By (15), this means that 〈Ω,⊥γβ〉
γ
EF
∗ = G∗i .
Then, according to Lemma 3.13, 〈Ω,⊥γβ〉E∗ = 〈Ω,⊥γβ〉−γH∗, where H is the result of replacing in E the
quasiatom F by Gi. Applying (16) and changing γβ back to α, the just-derived equation can be rewritten
as 〈Ω,⊥α〉E∗ = 〈Ω〉H∗. To conclude that condition (iii) of Lemma 3.20 is satisfied, it remains to notice that
Ω is H-manageable. This is so for the same reasons as in Lemma 3.16.
Case (iv): F is ⊓xG(x) or⊔xG(x). This case is similar to the previous one, only we need to use clauses
7 and 8 (instead of 5 and 6) of Lemma 4.7 of [6], and also rely on Lemma 3.5 when doing so. ✷
3.5 Finalization
We define the relation ≤ on elementary games by stipulating that A ≤ B iff, for every valuation e, whenever
e[A] is true, so is e[B]. Informally this can be read as “B is at least as true as A”.
Lemma 3.21 Assume p1 and p2 are same-arity elementary letters; F1 is an elementary formula; F2 is the
result of replacing in F1 a positive (resp. negative) occurrence of p1 by p2; and
∗ is an interpretation such
that p∗1 and p
∗
2 have the same canonical tuple, with p
∗
2 ≤ p
∗
1 (resp. p
∗
1 ≥ p
∗
2). Then F
∗
2 ≤ F
∗
1 .
Idea. The above lemma, in fact, does nothing but rephrases, in our terms, a well known fact from classical
logic. Let us not be lazy to still verify it for safety.
Proof. Assume the conditions of the lemma. Let (x1, . . . , xn) be the canonical tuple of p
∗
1 and p
∗
2, and
p1(t1, . . . , tn) be the atom of F1 in which p1 got replaced by p2 when obtaining F2. We proceed by induction
17
on the complexity of F1. As was done earlier, the inductive step will be limied to the cases when the main
operator of F1 is ¬, ∨ or ∃.
If F1 is atomic, then F1 = p1(t1, . . . , tn) and F2 = p2(t1, . . . , tn). The occurrence of p1 in F1 is thus positive
and hence, by the conditions of the lemma, p∗2 ≤ p
∗
1. Pick any valuation e. Let g be the valuation that
agrees with e on all variables that are not among x1, . . . , xn, such that g(x1) = e(t1), . . . , g(xn) = e(tn). By
Definition 4.1 of [6], e[p∗1(t1, . . . , tn)] = g[p
∗
1(x1, . . . , xn)] and e[p
∗
2(t1, . . . , tn)] = g[p
∗
2(x1, . . . , xn)]. But p
∗
2 ≤ p
∗
1
implies that, whenever g[p∗2(x1, . . . , xn)] is true, so is g[p
∗
1(x1, . . . , xn)]; hence, whenever e[p
∗
2(t1, . . . , tn)] is
true, so is e[p∗1(t1, . . . , tn)]. As e was arbitrary, we conclude that F
∗
2 ≤ F
∗
1 .
Suppose now F1 = ¬G1. Then F2 = ¬G2, where the conditions of the lemma are satisfied with
G2, G1, p2, p1 in the role of F1, F2, p1, p2, respectively (the subscripts 1 and 2 have been interchanged because
what was positive in F1, F2, is negative in G1, G2, and vice versa). Hence, by the induction hypothesis,
G∗1 ≤ G
∗
2. This obviously means ¬G
∗
2 ≤ ¬G
∗
1, i.e. F
∗
2 ≤ F
∗
1 .
Next, suppose F1 is a disjunction. Without loss of generality, we may assume that the replaced occurrence
of p1 happens to be in the first disjunct. So, F1 has the form G1∨H1∨ . . .∨Hn and F2 is G2∨H1∨ . . .∨Hn,
where the conditions of the lemma are satisfied with G1 and G2 in the role of F1 and F2, respectively. By
the induction hypothesis, G∗2 ≤ G
∗
1. Obviously this implies F
∗
2 ≤ F
∗
1 .
Finally, suppose F1 = ∃xG1, so that we have F2 = ∃xG2, where the conditions of the lemma are satisfied
with G1 and G2 in the role of F1 and F2, respectively. Pick any valuation e and assume e[∃xG∗2] is true. By
the definition of ∃, this means that g[G∗2] is true for some valuation g that agrees with e on all variables except
perhaps x. But, by the induction hypothesis, G∗2 ≤ G
∗
1, so that, for that g, g[G
∗
1] is also true. Consequently,
e[∃xG∗1] is true. Since e was arbitrary, we conclude that F ∗2 ≤ F ∗1 . ✷
Now we introduce the operation 〈Γ〉 ↓A of the type {runs}×{games} → {elemntary games}, which is
rather similar to prefixation. The meaning of the predicate 〈Γ〉↓A, which we call the Γ-finalization of A,
is “Γ is a ⊤-won run of e[A]”. That is, 〈Γ〉↓A is true at e iff WnAe 〈Γ〉 = ⊤. This operation is only defined
when Γ is a unilegal run of A. Here is an official definition:
Definition 3.22 Let A be any game and Γ a unilegal run of A. 〈Γ〉 ↓A is defined by: Lr〈Γ〉↓Ae = {〈〉};
Wn〈Γ〉↓Ae 〈〉 =Wn
A
e 〈Γ〉.
Extending Convention 3.10 to finalization, every time we write 〈Γ〉↓A, we implicitly claim that this game
is defined, i.e. Γ ∈ LRA. The follwoing fact is immediate from the relevant definitions:
Lemma 3.23 For any games A,A1, . . . , An (n ≥ 2) we have:
1. 〈〉↓(A1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ An) = 〈〉↓⊓xA = ⊤.
2. 〈〉↓(A1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ An) = 〈〉↓⊔xA = ⊥.
The following lemma, which is very similar to (but somewhat simpler than) Lemma 3.11, can be verified
by a routine analysis of the relevant definitions:
Lemma 3.24 Let A,A1, . . . , An (n ≥ 2) be any games, x any variable, and Γ any run. For each of the
following clauses, we assume that Γ is a unilegal run of the game to which Γ-finalization is applied; for
clause 3 we also assume that A is x-unistructural. Then:
1. 〈Γ〉↓¬A = ¬(〈¬Γ〉↓A).
2. 〈Γ〉↓(A1 ∨ . . . ∨ An) = 〈Γ1.〉↓A1 ∨ . . . ∨ 〈Γn.〉↓An.
3. 〈Γ〉↓∃xA = ∃x〈Γ〉↓A.
Immediately based on Definition 3.22 and the definition of substitution of variables (Definition 4.1 of [6]),
we also easily find that the following is true:
Lemma 3.25 Let A be a game, ~x an n-tuple of pairwise distinct variables, ~t any n-tuple of terms, and Γ a
unilegal run of A. Then (〈Γ〉↓A)[~x/~t] = 〈Γ〉↓(A[~x/~t]).
Lemma 3.26 Assume E,F are hyperformulas, G is a quasiatom of E, and H is the result of replacing this
quasiatom by F in E. Further assume γ is the E-specification of G, ∗ is an interpretation admissible for
both E and H, and Γ is a unilegal run of E∗ with 〈ΓγE〉↓G
∗ = F ∗. Then 〈Γ〉↓E∗ = 〈Γ−γ〉↓H∗.
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Proof. This lemma is very similar to Lemma 3.13, and the proof of the latter can be literally repeated here
as long as in it we replace Φ by Γ, prefixation by finalization, and references to Lemma 3.11 by references to
Lemma 3.24. ✷
Lemma 3.27 Assume E is a stable, reasonable, closed hyperformula, ∗ is an E-admissible perfect interpre-
tation,5 and Γ is an E-manageable (uni)legal run of E∗. Then WnE
∗
〈Γ〉 = ⊤.
Idea. In the role of E, let us take the obviously stable hyperformula S ∨ ¬Pq ∨
(
(Pq ∧⊓xQ(x) ∧ (r ∨ ¬r)
)
.
Consider the E-manageable run Γ = 〈⊥1.α,⊥2.β,⊥3.1.δ,⊤2.δ,⊤3.1.β〉, and assume it is in LRE (by abuse
of concepts, here we identify hyperformulas with their interpretations). Applying Lemma 3.26 as many times
as the number of non-elementary quasiatoms of E, we find that 〈Γ〉↓E is the proposition
(
〈⊥α〉↓S
)
∨ ¬
(
〈⊤β,⊥δ〉↓Pq
)
∨
((
〈⊥δ,⊤β〉↓Pq)
)
∧
(
〈〉↓⊓xQ(x)
)
∧
(
r ∨ ¬r
))
. (17)
Remembering the meaning of finalization, our lemma’s claim that Γ is a ⊤-won run of E means nothing but
that 〈Γ〉↓E, i.e. (17), is true. So, what we want to understand is why (17) is guaranteed to be true. Let us
look at the elementarization
⊥ ∨ ¬q ∨
(
q ∧ ⊤ ∧ (r ∨ ¬r)
)
(18)
of E. It is a tautology due to the stability of E. We now want to see that (17) has to be “at least as true”
as (18). First of all, note that, by Lemma 3.23, the 〈〉↓⊓xQ(x) part of (17) is identical to the corresponding
part ⊤ of (18). The applicability of Lemma 3.23 here is not just a lucky coincidence, and in the general case
is guaranteed by clause 1 of Definition 3.14, according to which a manageable run would never contain moves
made in choice subcomponents of the game such as — in our case — ⊓xQ(x). Next, while the 〈⊥α〉 ↓S
part of (17) is not necessarily the same as the corresponding part ⊥ of (18), at least the former can never be
“more false” than the latter, so it is fine if we show the truth of (17) while generously seeing in it ⊥ instead
of 〈⊥α〉↓S. Again, remembering what elementarization does to general atoms such as — in our case — S,
this sort of a “not more false” situation with general-letter-related components is not an accident. Thus,
what would suffice now to see is the truth of
⊥ ∨ ¬
(
〈⊤β,⊥δ〉↓Pq
)
∨
((
〈⊥δ,⊤β〉↓Pq)
)
∧ ⊤ ∧ (r ∨ ¬r)
)
. (19)
Let us look at the following formula, which is a substitutional instance of the tautological (18) and hence
true:
⊥ ∨ ¬
(
〈⊤β,⊥δ〉↓Pq
)
∨
((
〈⊤β,⊥δ〉↓Pq)
)
∧ ⊤ ∧ (r ∨ ¬r)
)
. (20)
The two formulas (19) and (20) only differ in the first conjunct of the third disjunct. So, to conclude that
(19) is true, it would be sufficient to see that 〈⊥δ,⊤β〉 ↓ Pq is “at least as true” as 〈⊤β,⊥δ〉 ↓ Pq. But
this is indeed so: by condition 2 of Definition 3.14, 〈⊥δ,⊤β〉 is a ⊤-delay of 〈⊤β,⊥δ〉, and therefore —
by the property of static games — the former is won by ⊤ as long as the latter is so; in other words,
〈⊤β,⊥δ〉↓Pq ≤ 〈⊥δ,⊤β〉↓Pq.
Proof. Assume the conditions of the lemma. Since Γ ∈ LRE
∗
, by Lemma 3.12, every labmove of Γ has
the form ℘γβ, where γ is the E-specification of a non-elementary quasiatom G. If such a G is H1 ⊓ . . .⊓Hn
or ⊓xH , as Γ is E-manageable, we have ΓγE = 〈〉 and hence, by clause 1 of Lemma 3.23, 〈Γ
γ
E〉 ↓G
∗ = ⊤.
Similarly, if G is H1 ⊔ . . . ⊔Hn or ⊔xH , clause 2 of the same lemma yields 〈ΓγE〉↓G∗ = ⊥. Thus we have:
If γ E-specifies a ⊓- or ⊓-quasiatom G, then 〈ΓγE〉↓G∗ = ⊤∗.
If γ E-specifies a ⊔- or ⊔-quasiatom G, then 〈ΓγE〉↓G∗ = ⊥∗.
(21)
For each string γ that E-specifies a general or hybrid quasiatom G, let us fix a non-logical elementary
letter rγ not occurring in E (neither directly nor as the elementary component of a hybrid letter). We require
that the arity of such an rγ be 0 if G is a general atom, and be the same as the arity of G if the latter happens
to be a hybrid atom. We also require that all these rγ be pairwise distinct. The official definition views
5In fact, the conditions that E is closed and ∗ is perfect could be dropped here, but why bother.
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interpretations as total functions — ones defined for all letters of the language. This is only for convenience,
and obviously nothing will change if we assume in this proof that originally ∗ is only defined for the letters
occurring in E. Then we can extend ∗ to other letters — specifically, the above rγ — in an arbitrary way
that serves our goal. This is what will be done in the following two paragraphs.
For a γ that E-specifies a general quasiatom G, we let r∗γ be 〈Γ
γ
E〉 ↓ G
∗. The latter is defined, i.e.
ΓγE ∈ LR
G∗ , by Lemma 3.12 and our assumption that Γ ∈ LRE
∗
. Let us mark this for future references:
If γ E-specifies a general quasiatom G, then 〈ΓγE〉↓G
∗ = r∗γ . (22)
Next, consider a γ that E-specifies an n-ary hybrid quasiatom Pq(~t), with ~t abbreviating t1, . . . , tn. Let
Pq(~t
′) = Pq(t
′
1, . . . , t
′
n) be the other Pq-based quasiatom of E. Assume (~x) = (x1, . . . , xn) is the canonical
tuple of P ∗. Let ~y be the result of deleting in x1, . . . , xn every xi such that at least one of the terms ti,t
′
i is
a variable. And let ~z be the result of deleting in x1, . . . , xn every xi such that both ti and t
′
i are constants.
For convenience of representation and without loss of generality, we assume here that all variables from ~y
go before all variables from ~z in ~x; that is, for some m (fix it) with 1 ≤ m ≤ n, we have ~y = x1, . . . , xm and
~z = xm+1, . . . , xn. So, we can rewrite P
∗(~x) as P ∗(~y, ~z). The reasonabity of E implies that tm+1 = t
′
m+1,
. . . , tn = t
′
n. Let ~c = tm+1, . . . , tn,
~h = t1, . . . , tm and ~h
′ = t′1, . . . , t
′
m. So, we can rewrite Pq(~t) as Pq(
~h,~c)
and Pq(t
′) as Pq(~h
′,~c). As we agreed, for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, either ti or t′i is a variable and hence — since E
is closed — its occurrence within Pq(~t) or Pq(~t′) is blindly bound (it cannot be bound by a choice quantifier
because the occurrences of Pq(~t) and Pq(~t′) are surface ones). Then the E-admissibility of
∗ implies that
P ∗(~y, ~z) — and hence obviously P ∗(~y,~c) — is unistructural in each of the variables of ~y. Based on this, it
is not hard to see that the games P ∗(~y,~c) and P ∗(~h,~c) are equistructural. But, since Γ ∈ LRE
∗
, by Lemma
3.12, we have ΓγE ∈ LR
P∗(~h,~c). Consequently, ΓγE ∈ LR
P∗(~y,~c), and hence the game 〈ΓγE〉↓P
∗(~y,~c) is defined.
This makes it possible for us to extend ∗ to rγ by stipulating that
∗ interprets it as the predicate r∗γ(~y, ~z),
with
r∗γ(~y, ~z) = 〈Γ
γ
E〉↓P
∗(~y,~c).
Note that r∗γ(~y, ~z) does not depend on ~z which is just a “place filler” to match the requirement that rγ is
n-ary.6 Now:
• 〈ΓγE〉↓
(
Pq(~t)
)∗
= 〈ΓγE〉↓P
∗(~h,~c) — just rewriting
(
Pq(~t)
)∗
as P ∗(~t) and then (~t) as (~h,~c);
• 〈ΓγE〉↓P
∗(~h,~c) = 〈ΓγE〉↓
((
P ∗(~y,~c)
)
[~y/~h]
)
— rewriting P ∗(~h,~c) as
(
P ∗(~y,~c)
)
[~y/~h];
• 〈ΓγE〉↓
((
P ∗(~y,~c)
)
[~y/~h]
)
= 〈ΓγE〉↓
((
P ∗(~y,~c)
)
[~y/~h, ~z/~c]
)
— vacuously as P ∗(~y,~c) does not depend on ~z
and hence
(
P ∗(~y,~c)
)
[~y/~h] =
(
P ∗(~y,~c)
)
[~y/~h, ~z/~c];
• 〈ΓγE〉↓
((
P ∗(~y,~c)
)
[~y/~h, ~z/~c]
)
=
(
〈ΓγE〉↓
(
P ∗(~y,~c)
))
[~y/~h, ~z/~c] — by Lemma 3.25;
•
(
〈ΓγE〉↓
(
P ∗(~y,~c)
))
[~y/~h, ~z/~c] =
(
r∗γ(~y, ~z)
)
[~y/~h, ~z/~c] — by our definition of r∗γ ;
•
(
r∗γ(~y, ~z)
)
[~y/~h, ~z/~c] = r∗γ(~t) — just rewriting
(
r∗γ(~y, ~z)
)
[~y/~h, ~z/~c] as r∗γ(
~h,~c) and then (~h,~c) as (~t).
The above chain of equations yields 〈ΓγE〉↓
(
Pq(~t)
)∗
= r∗γ(~t). Generalizing to all γ, we thus have:
If γ E-specifies a hybrid quasiatom Pq(~t), then 〈Γ
γ
E〉↓
(
Pq(~t)
)∗
= r∗γ(~t). (23)
Claim 1 Assume π is the E-specification of a positive hybrid quasiatom, and ν is the E-specification of the
same-base negative hybrid quasiatom. Then r∗ν and r
∗
π have the same canonical tuple, and r
∗
ν ≤ r
∗
π.
To verify this claim, assume its conditions, and assume the hybrid quasiatoms that are E-specified
by π and ν are Pq-based. Let (~x) be the canonical tuple of P
∗. We may assume that (~x) = (~y, ~z),
6Of course, from the very beginning we could have chosen rγ to be m-ary rather than n-ary. But we were lazy to explain
what m was at the time when the arity of rγ was chosen. This could also have made clumsy some of our forthcoming definitions.
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where ~y, ~z are as in the paragraph following (22), and so is ~c. Then, according to the stipulation of that
paragraph, r∗π = r
∗
π(~y, ~z) = 〈Γ
π〉 ↓ P ∗(~y,~c) and r∗ν = r
∗
ν(~y, ~z) = 〈¬Γ
ν〉 ↓ P ∗(~y,~c). But, by condition 2
of Definition 3.14, Γπ is a ⊤-delay of ¬Γν . Therefore, as P ∗(~y, ~z) and hence P ∗(~y,~c) is a static game,
〈¬Γν〉↓P ∗(~y,~c) ≤ 〈Γπ〉↓P ∗(~y,~c). Thus, r∗ν ≤ r
∗
π , and Claim 1 is proven.
Let E1 denote the result of replacing in E: 1) every ⊓- and ⊓- (resp. ⊔- and ⊔-) quasiatom by ⊤
(resp. ⊥); 2) every surface occurrence γ of each general atom by rγ ; and 3) every surface occurrence γ of
each hybrid letter7 by rγ ; From (21), (22) and (23), applying Lemma 3.26 as many times as the number
of non-elementary quasiatoms of E, we (with Lemma 3.12 in mind) get 〈Γ〉 ↓E∗ = 〈〉 ↓E∗1 . But E
∗
1 is an
elementary game, and obviously for every elementary game A, 〈〉↓A = A. Hence,
〈Γ〉↓E∗ = E∗1 . (24)
Assume E has m negative and n positive general quasiatoms, E-specified by δ1, . . . , δm and σ1, . . . , σn,
respectively. Let E2 be the result of replacing in E1 each atom rδi (1 ≤ i ≤ m) by ⊤, and each atom rσi
(1 ≤ i ≤ n) by ⊥. Applying Lemma 3.21 m+ n times, we get
E∗2 ≤ E
∗
1 . (25)
Next, assume E contains k hybrid letters, whose positive occurrences are E-specified by π1, . . . , πk, and
whose negative occurrences E-specified by ν1, . . . , νk, respectively. Let E3 be the result of replacing in E2
each letter rπi (1 ≤ i ≤ k) by rνi . Applying Claim 1 plus Lemma 3.21 k times, we get
E∗3 ≤ E
∗
2 . (26)
Let q1, . . . , qk be the list of the elementary components of the hybrid letters of E whose negative oc-
currences are E-specified by the above ν1, . . . , νk, respectively. Compare E3 with ‖E‖. An analysis of how
these two formulas have been obtained from E can reveal that E3 is just the result of replacing in ‖E‖ every
occurrence of every letter qi (1 ≤ i ≤ k) by rνi . That is, E3 is a substitutional instance (in the standard
classical sense) of ‖E‖. The latter is classically valid because, by our assumptions, E is stable. Hence E3 is
also classically valid, and thus E∗3 is true. Then, by (26), (25) and (24), so is 〈Γ〉↓E
∗. This means nothing
but that WnE
∗
〈Γ〉 = ⊤. ✷
4 Soundness of CL4
Lemma 4.1 If CL4 ⊢ F , then F is valid (any formula F ). Moreover, there is an effective procedure that
takes a CL4-proof of an arbitrary formula F and constructs an HPM that wins F ∗ for every F -admissible
interpretation ∗.
Proof. In view of Proposition 3.2 of [6], it would be sufficient to prove the above lemma — in particular,
the ‘Moreover’ clause of it — with “fair EPM” instead of “HPM”. Also, Lemmas 3.1 and 3.3 allow us to
safely replace “CL4-proof” by “reasonable CL4◦-proof” in our present lemma. With these remarks in mind,
Lemma 4.1 is an immediate consequence of the following Lemma 4.2. ✷
Lemma 4.2 There is an effective procedure that takes a reasonable CL4◦-proof of a hyperformula F and
constructs a fair EPM E such that, for every F -admissible interpretation ∗, E |= F ∗.
Idea. Every reasonable CL4◦-proof, in fact, can be viewed as an interpretation-independent winning strat-
egy for ⊤, and the fair EPM E that we are going to design just follows such a strategy. As we probably
remember from the soundness proof given in [6], the same was the case with CL3-proofs, where each
conclusion-to-premise transition of Rule A encoded a move by ⊥ (with all premises accounting for all pos-
sible legal moves by ⊥), and the conclusion-to-premise transition of Rules B1 and B2 encoded the “good”
7Note that while in clause 2) the whole atom is replaced, in clause 3) only the letter is replaced, without affecting the
attached tuple of terms of the atom.
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move that ⊤ should make in a given situation; in either case, after a move was made, ⊤’s strategy would
jump to the corresponding premise H , recursively calling itself on H . In our present case this intuitive
meaning of Rules A, B1 and B2 is retained. In addition, Rule C◦ signals ⊤ that from now on it should try
— using copy-cat methods — to keep identical8 the subplays/subruns in the two occurrences of the hybrid
atom introduced (in the bottom-up view) by that rule.
The overall situation with CL3, however, was much simpler than it is with CL4◦. In CL3-proof-derived
strategies, as we just noted, to every legal move in a play corresponded a transition from a given formula
to one of its premises H in the proof. This is no longer the case with CL4◦. Specifically, there is nothing
in CL4◦-proofs corresponding to moves made in non-choice quasiatoms. So, by the time when the strategy
jumps to H , the game to which the original game will have been “brought down” may be not H∗ but rather
〈Ω〉H∗, where Ω is the sequence of the moves made by the two players in the hybrid and general quasiatoms
of H . Thus, the strategy has to be successful for such 〈Ω〉H∗ rather than (as was the case with CL3-proof-
derived strategies) just for H∗. Fortunately, it turns out that success in this more complicated situation is
still possible as long as Ω is H-manageable; and ensuring that Ω is indeed always manageable also turns out
to be a “manageable” task for ⊤. This is where all of our manageability-related lemmas from the previous
section come to help.
Now a little more detailed — yet informal — description of how our strategy/machine E works for a
hyperformula F with a reasonable CL4◦-proof. For safety and without loss of generality, we can limit
our considerations to perfect interpretations and also assume that F is closed. As noted, the strategy is
recursive, at every step dealing with 〈Ω〉E∗, where E is a CL4◦-provable reasonable hyperformula and Ω is
an E-manageable (legal) position of E∗. Initially E = F and Ω = 〈〉. How E acts on 〈Ω〉E∗ depends on by
which of the four rules E is derived in CL4◦.
If E is derived by Rule B1 or B2 from H , the machine — exactly as in [6] — makes the move α
“prescribed” by that application of the rule. Say, if E = G(7)→⊔zG(z) and H = G(7)→ G(7), then ‘2.7’
is such a move. Lemmas 3.16 and 3.17 tell us that Ω remains H-manageable and that α brings 〈Ω〉E∗ down
to 〈Ω〉H∗. So, after making move α, the machine switches to its winning strategy for 〈Ω〉H∗. This, by the
induction hypothesis, guarantees a success.
If E is derived by Rule C◦ from H through replacing the two occurrences of a hybrid letter Pq in H by
P , then the machine finds within Ω and copies, in the positive occurrence of Pq, all of the moves made so
far by the environment in the negative occurrence of Pq (or rather in the corresponding occurrence of the
P -based atom), and vice versa. This series of moves brings the game down to 〈Ω′〉E∗ = 〈Ω′〉H∗, where Ω′
is the result of adding those moves to Ω. Lemma 3.19 guarantees that Ω′ is H-manageable. So, now the
machine switches to its successful strategy for 〈Ω′〉H∗ and eventually wins.
Finally, suppose E is derived by Rule A. Our machine keeps granting permission. Now and then the
environment will be making moves in general quasiatoms of E, to which E does not react. However, every
time ⊥ makes a move in one of the hybrid quasiatoms, E copies that move in the other same-base quasiatom.
Clauses (i) and (ii) of Lemma 3.20 guarantee that, while this is going on, (the continuously updated) Ω
remains E-manageable. So, if nothing else happens, in view of Lemma 3.15, Ω — even if its grows infinite
— remains E-manageable, and then Lemma 3.27 guarantees that the game will be won by ⊤ because, as a
conclusion of Rule A, E is stable. However, what will typically happen during this stage (except one — the
last — case) is that sooner or later ⊥ makes a legal move not in a hybrid or general quasiatom, but rather
a move signifying a decision associated with a choice quasiatom of E. E.g., if E = (Pq ∨ ¬Pq) ∧ (G3 ⊓G4),
then ‘2.1’ can be such a move. Now the situation is very similar to the case with Rules B1 or B2: the
machine simply switches to its winning strategy for 〈Ω〉H∗, where H is the corresponding premise of E
(H = (Pq ∨ ¬Pq) ∧ G3 in our example). Clauses (iii)(2) and (iv)(2) of Lemma 3.20 guarantee that 〈Ω〉H
∗
is indeed the game to which 〈Ω〉E∗ has evolved; and, according to clauses (iii)(1) and (iv)(1) of the same
lemma, Ω is H-manageable, so that, by the induction hypothesis, E knows how to win 〈Ω〉H∗.
Proof. Fix a hyperformula F together with a reasonable CL4◦-proof for it. In the present context we view
such a proof as a sequence (rather than tree) of hyperformulas. We will be referring to this sequence as “the
proof”, and referring to hyperformulas occurring in the proof as “proof hyperformulas”. We assume that
8This is generally impossible in the literal sense, but what is possible is to ensure that one play is a ⊤-delay of the other
which, taking into account that we are talking about static games, is just as good as if the two plays were fully identical.
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there are no repetitions or other redundancies in the proof (otherwise eliminate them), and that each proof
hyperformula comes with a fixed justification — an indication of by which rule and from what premises the
hyperformula was derived.
We construct the EPM E whose work can be described as follows. At the beginning it creates three
records: E to hold a hyperformula, Ω to hold a position, and f to hold a (representation of a) finite
valuation.9 E is initialized to F , Ω initialized to 〈〉, and f initialized to {x1/c1, . . . , xs/cs}, where x1, . . . , xs
are all the free variables of F and, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ s, ci is the value assigned to xi by the valuation spelled
on the valuation tape. After this initialization step, E follows the following interactive algorithm MAIN
LOOP. The description of this algorithm assumes that, at the beginning of each iteration of MAIN LOOP
or INNER LOOP, E is a proof hyperformula, and also that, for every free variable x of E, f contains exactly
one element x/c and vice versa: for every element x/c of f , x is a free variable of E. That these conditions
are always satisfied can be immediately seen from the description of the algorithm.
Procedure MAIN LOOP: Act depending on which of the four rules was used (last) to derive E in the proof:
Case of Rule B1 Let H be the premise of E in the proof. H is the result of replacing in E a certain
negative (resp. positive) surface occurrence γ of a subhyperformula G1 ⊓ . . .⊓Gn (resp. G1 ⊔ . . .⊔Gn)
by Gi for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Then make the move γi; update f by deleting in it all pairs z/c where
z is not a free variable of H ; update E to H ; repeat MAIN LOOP.
Case of Rule B2 Let H be the premise of E in the proof. H is the result of replacing in E a negative
(resp. positive) surface occurrence γ of a subhyperformula ⊓xG(x) (resp. ⊔xG(x)) by G(t) for some
term t such that (if t is a variable) neither the above occurrence of ⊓xG(x) (resp. ⊔xG(x)) in E nor
any of the free occurrences of x in G are in the scope of ∀t, ∃t, ⊓t or ⊔t. Let c = f(t).10 Then make
the move γc; as long as t is a free variable of H , update f to f ∪ {t/c}; update E to H ; repeat MAIN
LOOP.
Case of Rule C◦ Let H be the premise of E in the proof. E is the result of replacing in H the positive
surface occurrence π and the negative surface occurrence ν of some hybrid letter Pq by the general letter
P . Let 〈⊥π1, . . . ,⊥πn〉 and 〈⊥ν1, . . . ,⊥νm〉 be Ωπ and Ων , respectively. Then: make the n+m moves
πν1, . . . , πνm, νπ1, . . . , νπn (in this very order); update Ω to 〈Ω,⊤πν1, . . . ,⊤πνm,⊤νπ1, . . . ,⊤νπn〉;
update E to H ; repeat MAIN LOOP.
Case of Rule A Follow the procedure INNER LOOP described below.
Procedure INNER LOOP: Keep granting permission until the adversary makes a move α, then act
depending on which of the following five subcases holds:
Subcase (i) α = γβ, where γ E-specifies a general quasiatom. Then update Ω to 〈Ω,⊥γβ〉, and
repeat INNER LOOP.
Subcase (ii) α = γβ, where γ E-specifies a hybrid quasiatom. Let σ be the E-specification of the
other same-base hybrid quasiatom. Then make the move σβ, update Ω to 〈Ω,⊥γβ,⊤σβ〉, and
repeat INNER LOOP.
Subcase (iii) α = γi, where γ E-specifies a positive (resp. negative) quasiatom G1 ⊓ . . .⊓Gn (resp.
G1 ⊔ . . . ⊔Gn) and i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Let H be the result of replacing in E the above quasiatom by
Gi. Then update f by deleting in it all pairs z/c where z is not a free variable of H ; update E to
H ; repeat MAIN LOOP.
Subcase (iv) α = γc, where γ E-specifies a positive (resp. negative) quasiatom ⊓xG(x) (resp.
⊔xG(x)). Let H be premise of E in the proof that is the result of replacing in E the above
quasiatom by G(y) for some variable y not occurring in E. Then, as long as y is a free variable
of H ,11 update f to f ∪ {y/c}; update E to H ; repeat MAIN LOOP.
9Remember from [6] that a finite valuation f is one that sends only a finite number of variables to something other than 0.
We agreed to represent such an f as a finite set of variable/constant pairs that has to include an entry for each variable z with
f(z) 6= 0, and may or may not include entries for other variables.
10Remember that, if t is a constant, then f (as any other valuation) sends it to itself, and if t is a variable not listed within
the variable/constant pairs of the representation of f , then f(t) = 0.
11I.e. unless x did not really have a free occurrence in G(x).
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Subcase (v) α does not satisfy the conditions of any of the above Subcases (i)-(iv). Then go to an
infinite loop in a permission state.
It is obvious that E can be constructed effectively from the CL4◦-proof of F . Pick an arbitrary F -
admissible interpretation ∗, an arbitrary valuation e and an arbitrary e-computation branch B of E . Fix Θ∞
as the run spelled by B. Our goal is to show that B is fair and that WnF
∗
e 〈Θ∞〉 = ⊤.
Consider the work of E in B. For each k ≥ 1 such that MAIN LOOP makes at least k iterations in B, let
Ek and fk denote the values of records E and f at the beginning of the kth iteration of MAIN LOOP, and
let Kk = fkEk. Evidently Ek+1 is always one of the premises of Ek in the proof, so that MAIN LOOP is
iterated only a finite number of times. Fix l as the number of these iterations. The lth (last) iteration deals
with the case of Rule A — and, besides, never with Subcases (iii) or (iv) within it — for otherwise there
would be a next iteration of MAIN LOOP. This guarantees that E will grant permission infinitely many
times during the lth iteration, so that branch B is indeed fair.
What remains to show now is that WnF
∗
e 〈Θ∞〉 = ⊤, i.e. Wn
e[F∗]〈Θ∞〉 = ⊤. f1 agrees with e on
all free variables of F = E1. Hence, by Lemma 3.7, e[F
∗] = e[(f1E1)
∗] = e[K∗1 ]. Let
⋆ be the perfect
interpretation induced by (∗, e). By Lemma 3.9, e[K∗1 ] = K
⋆
1 . Hence e[F
∗] = K⋆1 . Thus, our goal of showing
Wne[F
∗]〈Θ∞〉 = ⊤ now reduces to showing Wn
K⋆1 〈Θ∞〉 = ⊤. The latter is immediate when Θ∞ is a ⊥-
illegal run of K⋆1 . Hence we exclude this trivial case and, for the rest of this proof, assume that Θ∞ is not
a ⊥-illegal run of K∗1 . Speaking less formally, we assume that ⊥ never makes illegal moves. Note that the
K⋆i are constant games (Lemma 3.6), so we can talk about their legal, won, etc. runs — as we just did —
without mentioning e or bothering about the distinction between “legal” and “unilegal”.
The above-observed fact that El is derived by Rule A implies that
El is stable. (27)
For each i with 1 ≤ k ≤ l, let Θk be the initial segment of Θ∞ consisting of the moves made by the
beginning of the kth iteration of MAIN LOOP. Aslo, for each such k, let Ωk be the value of record Ω at the
beginning of the kth iteration of MAIN LOOP.
Claim 1 For any k with 1 ≤ k ≤ l,
Ωk is Kk-manageable; (28)
〈Θk〉K⋆1 = 〈Ωk〉K
⋆
k . (29)
This claim can be proven by induction on k. The basis case with k = 1 is trivial as Θ1 = Ω1 = 〈〉.
Now consider an arbitrary k with 1 ≤ k < l and assume (induction hypothesis) that conditions (28)-(29)
are satisfied. Note that, by Convention 3.10, condition (29) implies Θk ∈ LR
K⋆1 and Ωk ∈ LR
K⋆k . Implicitly
relying on this fact, we separately consider the following four cases, depending on with which case the kth
iteration of MAIN LOOP deals. In each case we want to show that the same two conditions continue to be
satisfied for k + 1, i.e. that the following statements are true:
Ωk+1 is Kk+1-manageable; (30)
〈Θk+1〉K⋆1 = 〈Ωk+1〉K
⋆
k+1. (31)
Case of Rule B1. Record Ω is not updated in this case, so Ωk+1 = Ωk. Also, exactly one (⊤-labeled)
move γi is made, where γ is the Ek- and hence Kk-specification of a negative (resp. positive) quasiatom
G1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Gn (resp. G1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Gn) and i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Thus, Θk+1 = 〈Θk,⊤γi〉. Note that Kk+1 relates
to Kk as H does to E in Lemma 3.16. Keeping this in mind, with Ωk = Ωk+1 in the role of Ω (which, by
our induction hypothesis, is a Kk-manageable unilegal run of Kk), we find that (30) follows from clause 1
of Lemma 3.16. According to clause 2 of the same lemma, 〈Ωk,⊤γi〉K⋆k = 〈Ωk〉K
⋆
k+1 = 〈Ωk+1〉K
⋆
k+1, i.e.
〈⊤γi〉〈Ωk〉K⋆k = 〈Ωk+1〉K
⋆
k+1.
12 But, by (29), 〈Ωk〉K⋆k = 〈Θk〉K
⋆
1 . Hence, 〈⊤γi〉〈Θk〉K
⋆
1 = 〈Ωk+1〉K
⋆
k+1, i.e.
〈Θk,⊤γi〉K
⋆
1 = 〈Ωk+1〉K
⋆
k+1, which, as 〈Θk,⊤γi〉 = Θk+1, proves (31).
12Here and very often later we implicitly rely on the fact that, for any game A and positions Ψ1 and Ψ2, the conditions
“〈Ψ1,Ψ2〉 ∈ LR
A” and “Ψ1 ∈ LR
A and 〈Ψ2〉 ∈ LR
〈Ψ1〉A” are equivalent and, whenever they are satisfied, we have 〈Ψ1,Ψ2〉A =
〈Ψ2〉〈Ψ1〉A. (〈Ψ2〉〈Ψ1〉A should be read as 〈Ψ2〉(〈Ψ1〉A).) An official proof of this easy-to-understand phenomenon is given in
[5], Lemma 3.4.
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Case of Rule B2. Similar to the previous one, only use Lemma 3.17 instead of Lemma 3.16.
Case of Rule C◦. With Ek in the role of E, let H , π, ν, π1, . . . , πn, ν1, . . . , νm be as in the description
of the ‘Case of Rule C◦’ clause of MAIN LOOP. Note that Ek+1 = H and
Ωk+1 = 〈Ωk,⊤πν1, . . . ,⊤πνm,⊤νπ1, . . . ,⊤νπn〉.
Now, with Ωk in the role of Ω, Kk in the role of E and Kk+1 in the role of H , the conditions of Lemma 3.19
are satisfied. Then, by that lemma, Ωk+1 is a Kk+1-manageable (uni)legal position of K
⋆
k+1, which proves
(30) and also ensures that 〈Ωk+1〉K⋆k+1 is defined. The latter can be rewritten as
〈⊤πν1, . . . ,⊤πνm,⊤νπ1, . . . ,⊤νπn〉〈Ωk〉K
⋆
k+1.
By (29), 〈Ωk〉K⋆k = 〈Θk〉K
⋆
1 . Also notice that K
⋆
k+1 = K
⋆
k , so 〈Ωk〉K
⋆
k+1 = 〈Θk〉K
⋆
1 . Hence 〈Ωk+1〉K
⋆
k+1 =
〈⊤πν1, . . . ,⊤πνm,⊤νπ1, . . . ,⊤νπn〉〈Θk〉K⋆1 . This means that
〈Ωk+1〉K
⋆
k+1 = 〈Θk,⊤πν1, . . . ,⊤πνm,⊤νπ1, . . . ,⊤νπn〉K
⋆
1 .
But Θk+1 = 〈Θk,⊤πν1, . . . ,⊤πνm,⊤νπ1, . . . ,⊤νπn〉. Hence 〈Ωk+1〉K⋆k+1 = 〈Θk+1〉K
⋆
1 . This proves (31).
Case of Rule A. The work of the machine during this (kth) iteration of MAIN LOOP consists of iterating
INNER LOOP a finite number lk of times (otherwise we would have k = l). Fix this lk. For each m with
1 ≤ m ≤ lk, let Θk,m be the initial segment of Θ∞ consisting of the moves made by the beginning of the mth
iteration of INNER LOOP within the kth iteration of MAIN LOOP. Similarly, for each such m, let Ωk,m
be the value of record Ω at the beginning of the mth iteration of INNER LOOP within the kth iteration of
MAIN LOOP.
Subclaim 1.1 For any m with 1 ≤ m ≤ lk,
Ωk,m is Kk-manageable; (32)
〈Θk,m〉K⋆1 = 〈Ωk,m〉K
⋆
k . (33)
We prove the above by induction on m. The basis with m = 1 is straightforward: we have Θk,1 = Θk
and Ωk,1 = Ωk, so this case is nothing but the induction hypothesis of the induction on k in our proof of
Claim 1, i.e. statements (28)-(29).
Now consider any m with 1 ≤ m < lk, and assume (32) and (33) are true (induction hypothesis). Let us
take a note that, by (33) and Convention 3.10, we have Θk,m ∈ LR
K⋆1 and Ωk,m ∈ LR
K⋆k . We want to show
that the following conditions are also satisfied:
Ωk,m+1 is Kk-manageable; (34)
〈Θk,m+1〉K⋆1 = 〈Ωk,m+1〉K
⋆
k . (35)
At the beginning of the mth iteration of INNER LOOP, the machine is waiting for the adversary to make
a move α. Such a move must be made because k is not the last iteration of MAIN LOOP. By our assumption
that ⊥ never makes illegal moves, 〈Θk,m,⊥α〉 must be a legal position of K⋆1 , whence 〈⊥α〉 ∈ LR
〈Θk,m〉K
⋆
1 ,
whence, by (33), 〈⊥α〉 ∈ LR〈Ωk,m〉K
⋆
k , whence 〈Ωk,m,⊥α〉 ∈ LR
K⋆k . This means that α, Kk (in the role of
E) and Ωk,m (in the role of Ω) satisfy the conditions of Lemma 3.20. Then, in view of that lemma, it is
obvious that α — now with Ek in the role of E — should satisfy the conditions of one of the Subcases (i),
(ii), (iii) or (iv) from the description of INNER LOOP. Subcases (iii) and (iv) are impossible because then
we would have m = lk. Thus, either Subcase (i) or Subcase (ii) should be satisfied.
Suppose Subcase (i) is satisfied, with α = γβ as described in that subcase. Then Ωk,m+1 = 〈Ωk,m,⊥γβ〉,
and (34) holds by clause (i) of Lemma 3.20, which also asserts that 〈Ωk,m,⊥γβ〉 ∈ LR
K⋆k . According to (33),
〈Ωk,m〉K⋆k = 〈Θk,m〉K
⋆
1 , and hence 〈Ωk,m,⊥γβ〉K
⋆
k = 〈Θk,m,⊥γβ〉K
⋆
1 , i.e. 〈Ωk,m+1〉K
⋆
k = 〈Θk,m,⊥γβ〉K
⋆
1 .
But in our case Θk,m+1 = 〈Θk,m,⊥γβ〉. Therefore, 〈Θk,m+1〉K⋆1 = 〈Ωk,m+1〉K
⋆
k . This proves (35).
Suppose now Subcase (ii) is satisfied, with α = γβ and σ as described in that subcase. Then Ωk,m+1 =
〈Ωk,m,⊥γβ,⊤σβ〉. Now, (34) follows from clause (ii) of Lemma 3.20, which also asserts that 〈Ωk,m,⊥γβ,⊤σβ〉
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is in LRK
⋆
k . And, taking into account that Θk,m+1 = 〈Θk,m,⊥γβ,⊤σβ〉, (35) follows from (33). Subclaim
1.1 is proven.
Back to the ‘Case of Rule A’ step of our proof of Claim 1. Consider the lkth (last) iteration of INNER
LOOP within the kth iteration of MAIN LOOP. Since k < l, obviously this iteration deals with one of
the Subcases (iii) or (iv). Let α and H be as in the description of Subcase (iii) (resp. (iv)). Note that
Ek+1 = H and Ωk+1 = Ωk,lk . For the same reasons as in the proof of Subclaim 1.1 (with lk in the role of
m), 〈Ωk,lk ,⊥α〉 is a legal position of K
⋆
k . According to Subclaim 1.1, we have:
Ωk,lk is Kk-manageable; (36)
〈Θk,lk〉K
⋆
1 = 〈Ωk,lk〉K
⋆
k . (37)
Statement (30) follows from (36) by clause (iii)(1) (resp. (iv)(1)) of Lemma 3.20. According to clause
(iii)(2) (resp. (iv)(2)) of the same lemma, 〈Ωk,lk ,⊥α〉K
⋆
k = 〈Ωk,lk〉K
⋆
k+1 and hence 〈Ωk,lk ,⊥α〉K
⋆
k =
〈Ωk+1〉K⋆k+1. This, in turn, implies 〈⊥α〉〈Ωk,lk 〉K
⋆
k = 〈Ωk+1〉K
⋆
k+1. By (37), 〈Ωk,lk〉K
⋆
k = 〈Θk,lk〉K
⋆
1 . Hence
〈⊥α〉〈Θk,lk〉K
⋆
1 = 〈Ωk+1〉K
⋆
k+1 and thus 〈Θk,lk ,⊥α〉K
⋆
1 = 〈Ωk+1〉K
⋆
k+1. But observe that 〈Θk,lk ,⊥α〉 =
Θk+1. Therefore (31) holds. Claim 1 is proven.
We continue our proof of Lemma 4.2. Consider the last (lth) iteration of MAIN LOOP. As we noted earlier
when deriving (27), this iteration deals with the case of Rule A. Let N be {1, . . . , k} if k is the number
of iterations of INNER LOOP within the lth iteration of MAIN LOOP, and be {1, 2, 3, . . .} if there are
infinitely many such iterations. For each m ∈ N , as before, let Θl,m be the initial segment of Θ∞ consisting
of the moves made by the beginning of the mth iteration of INNER LOOP within the lth iteration of MAIN
LOOP, and let Ωl,m be the value of record Ω at the beginning of the mth iteration of INNER LOOP within
the lth iteration of MAIN LOOP. For the same reasons13 as in the proof of (32) and (33) (where from (33)
we only need its implicit statement that Ωk,m ∈ LR
K⋆k ), we have:
For any m ∈ N , Ωl,m is a Kl-manageable legal position of K
⋆
l . (38)
Note that, during the work of E , every update of record Ω extends its previous value by adding new labmoves
to it, without ever deleting old labmoves. So, let Ω∞ be the “ultimate” value of Ω, precisely meaning the
shortest run such that, for every m ∈ N , Ωl,m is an initial segment of Ω∞ . Of course, if N = {1, . . . , k},
then Ω∞ is simply Ωl,k. Statement (38) — together with Lemma 3.15 when Ω∞ is infinite — implies that
Ω∞ is a Kl-manageable legal run of K
⋆
l . Therefore, by (27) and Lemma 3.27, we have
WnK
⋆
l 〈Ω∞〉 = ⊤. (39)
Ω∞ is an extension of Ωl, so that Ω∞ = 〈Ωl,∆〉 for some run ∆. Let us fix this ∆. Now (39) can
be rewritten as WnK
⋆
l 〈Ωl,∆〉 = ⊤. In turn, the latter — remembering the definition of the operation of
prefixation and taking into account that, by (29), Ωl ∈ LR
K⋆l — can be rewritten as Wn〈Ωl〉K
⋆
l 〈∆〉 = ⊤.
Now, according to Claim 1, 〈Ωl〉K
⋆
l = 〈Θl〉K
⋆
1 . Thus, Wn
〈Θl〉K
⋆
1 〈∆〉 = ⊤, which can be rewritten back as
WnK
⋆
1 〈Θl,∆〉 = ⊤. (40)
For the same reasons14 as in our proof of Subclaim 1.1, iterations of INNER LOOP within the lth iteration
of MAIN LOOP never deal with Subcases (iii), (iv) or (v) of ‘Case of Rule A’. The remaining Subcases (i)
and (ii) add to record Ω all of the moves made by the players (and no other moves, of course). Therefore,
taking into account that the value of that record is Ωl when the lth iteration of MAIN LOOP starts, we can
see that ∆ is nothing but exactly the sequence of all moves made during the lth iteration of MAIN LOOP.
Hence Θ∞ = 〈Θl,∆〉. Thus, by (40), Wn
K⋆1 〈Θ∞〉 = ⊤, and our proof of Lemma 4.2 is complete. ✷
13With the minor difference that now the reason why Subcases (iii) and (iv) are impossible is that otherwise l would not be
the last iteration of MAIN LOOP.
14Again, with the minor difference pointed out in the previous footnote.
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5 Completeness of CL4
Lemma 5.1 If CL4 6⊢ F , then F is not valid (any formula F ). Moreover, if CL4 6⊢ F , then F ∗ is not
computable for some F -admissible interpretation ∗ that interprets elementary letters as finitary predicates of
arithmetical complexity ∆2, and interprets general letters as problems of the form (A
1
1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ A
1
m) ⊓ . . . ⊓
(A1m ⊔ . . . ⊔ A
m
m), where each A
j
i is a finitary predicate of arithmetical complexity ∆2.
Idea. The reader may want to start by trying the following Exercise: Verify that P → P ∧ P is not valid.
Hint: Show that CL3 6⊢ (p1 ⊓ p2)→ (p1 ⊓ p2)∧ (p1 ⊓ p2), then remember the completeness theorem for CL3.
The above hint provides insights into the basic idea underlying our proof of Lemma 5.1. We are going
to show that, whenever CL4 6⊢ F , there is a CL3-formula ⌈F ⌉ of the same form as F that is not provable
in CL3; this, in view of the already known completeness of CL3, immediately yields non-validity for F .
Precisely, “the same form as F” will mean that ⌈F ⌉ is the result of rewriting in F every n-ary general atom
P (~t) as
(
Pˇ 11 (~t) ⊔ . . . ⊔ Pˇ
1
m(~t)
)
⊓ . . . ⊓
(
Pˇm1 (~t) ⊔ . . . ⊔ Pˇ
m
m (~t)
)
, where m is a “sufficiently big” number and the
Pˇ ij are arbitrary “neutral” (not occurring in F and pairwise distinct) n-ary elementary letters. Let us call
the above long formula a molecule and say that the general letter P is its base.
Intuitively, the reason why CL3 6⊢ ⌈F ⌉, i.e. why ⊤ cannot win (the game represented by) ⌈F ⌉, is that
a smart environment may start choosing different conjuncts/disjuncts in different occurrences of molecules.
The best that ⊤ can do in such a play is to match any given positive or negative occurrence of a molecule
with one (but not more!) negative or positive occurrence of a same-base molecule — match in the sense that
mimic environment’s moves in order to keep the subgames/subformulas at the two occurrences identical.
Yet, this is not sufficient for ⊤ to achieve a guaranteed success. This is so because ⊤’s decisions about what
pairs of molecules to match in ⌈F ⌉ can be modeled by appropriate applications of Rule C in an attempted
CL4-proof of F , and so can be — through Rules A, B1 and B2 — either player’s decisions required by
the choice operators in the non-molecule parts of ⌈F ⌉. A winning strategy (CL3-proof) for ⌈F ⌉ would then
translate into a CL4-proof for F , which, however, does not exist.
Proof. Fix a CL4-formula F . Let P be the set of all general letters occurring in F . Let us fix m as the
total number of occurrences of such letters in F ;15 if there are fewer than 2 of such occurrences, then we
take m = 2. For the rest of this section, let us agree that
a, b always range over {1, . . . ,m}.
Let us pick some pool z1, z2, . . . of variables not occurring in F . For each n-ary P ∈ P and each a, b,
with ~z abbreviating z1, . . . , zn, we fix the atom
• Pˇ ab (~z),
where Pˇ ab is an n-ary non-logical elementary letter not occurring in F . We assume that Pˇ
a
b 6= Qˇ
c
d as long as
either P 6= Q or a 6= c or b 6= d. Note that the Pˇ ab are elementary letters despite our “tradition” according
to which the capital letters P,Q, . . . stand for general letters.
Next, for each n-ary P ∈ P and each a, we define
• Pˇ a
⊔
(~z) = Pˇ a1 (~z) ⊔ . . . ⊔ Pˇ
a
m(~z).
Finally, for each n-ary P ∈ P , we define
• Pˇ⊓
⊔
(~z) = Pˇ 1
⊔
(~z) ⊓ . . . ⊓ Pˇm
⊔
(~z) =
(
Pˇ 11 (~z) ⊔ . . . ⊔ Pˇ
1
m(~z)
)
⊓ . . . ⊓
(
Pˇm1 (~z) ⊔ . . . ⊔ Pˇ
m
m (~z)
)
.
For an n-ary P ∈ P and an n-tuple ~t of terms, we refer to the formulas Pˇ ab (~t), Pˇ
a
⊔
(~t) and Pˇ⊓
⊔
(~t) as
molecules, in particular, P (~t)-based molecules, where “(~t)” can be omitted when there is no need to
indicate this parameter. We can also more specifically refer to Pˇ ab (~t) as a
16 Pˇ ab -molecule, refer to Pˇ
a
⊔
(~t) as a
Pˇ a
⊔
-molecule, and refer to Pˇ⊓
⊔
(~t) as a Pˇ⊓
⊔
-molecule. To differentiate between the three sorts of molecules,
15In fact, a much smaller m would be sufficient for our purposes. E.g., m can be chosen to be such that no given general
letter has more than m occurrences in F . But why try to economize.
16We say “a” rather than “the” here because, while P , a and b are fixed, ~t may vary.
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we call the molecules of the type Pˇ ab (~t) small, call the molecules of the type Pˇ
a
⊔
(~t) medium, and call the
molecules of the type Pˇ⊓
⊔
(~t) large.
For simplicity, for the rest of this section we assume/pretend that the languages of CL3 and CL4 have
no non-logical letters other than those occurring in F plus the letters Pˇ ab (P ∈ P , a, b ∈ {1, . . . ,m}). This
way the scopes of the terms “CL4-formula” and “CL3-formula” are correspondingly redefined.
Let us say that an occurrence of a molecule in a given CL3-formula is independent iff it is not a part of
another (“larger”) molecule. E.g., the occurrence of Pˇ ab (~t) in Pˇ
a
b (~t)→ ⊥ is independent, while in Pˇ
a
⊔
(~t)→ ⊥,
i.e. in Pˇ a1 (~t)⊔ . . .⊔ Pˇ
a
b (~t)⊔ . . .⊔ Pˇ
a
m(~t)→ ⊥, it is not. Of course, surface occurrences of molecules are always
independent, and so are any — surface or non-surface — occurrences of large molecules.
We say that a CL3-formula E is good iff the following conditions are satisfied:
Cond1: E contains at most m independent occurrences of molecules.
Cond2: Only large molecules (may) have independent non-surface occurrences in E.
Cond3: For each a and b, E has at most one positive independent occurrence of a Pˇ ab -molecule and at
most one negative independent occurrence of a Pˇ ab -molecule.
Cond4: For each a, E has at most one positive independent occurrence of a Pˇ a
⊔
-molecule, and when E has
such an occurrence, then for no b does E have a positive independent occurrence of a Pˇ ab -molecule.
Let E be a CL3-formula. By an isolated small molecule of E (or E-isolated small molecule, or a
small molecule isolated in E) we will mean a Pˇ ab -molecule that has an independent occurrence in E, such
that E contains no other independent occurrences of Pˇ ab -molecules. We will say that such a molecule is
positive or negative depending on whether its independent occurrence in E is positive or negative. Next,
the floorification of E, denoted by
⌊E⌋,
is the result of replacing in E every independent occurrence of every P (~t)-based large, medium and E-isolated
small molecule by the general atom P (~t).
Claim 1 For any good CL3-formula E, if CL3 ⊢ E, then CL4 ⊢ ⌊E⌋.
To prove this claim, assume E is good and CL3 ⊢ E. By induction on the length of the CL3-proof of
E, we want to show that CL4 ⊢ ⌊E⌋. We need to consider the following three cases, depending on which of
the three rules of CL3 was used (last) to derive E.
CASE 1: E is derived by Rule A. Let us fix the set ~H of premises of E. Each element of ~H is provable
in CL3. Hence, by the induction hypothesis, we have:
For any H ∈ ~H, if H is good, then CL4 ⊢ ⌊H⌋. (41)
We consider the following 3 subcases. The first two subcases are not mutually exclusive, and either can be
chosen when both apply. Specifically, Subcase 1.1 (resp. 1.2) is about when E has a positive (resp. negative)
surface occurrence of a large (resp. medium) molecule. Then, as we are going to see, replacing that molecule
by a “safe” conjunct (resp. disjunct), corresponding to a smart environment’s possible move, yields a good
formula H from ~H such that ⌊E⌋ = ⌊H⌋ which, by (41), automatically means the CL4-provability of ⌊E⌋.
The remaining Subcase 1.3 is about when all surface occurrences of large (resp. medium) molecules in E
are negative (resp. positive). This will be shown to imply that ⌊E⌋ follows from the floorifications of some
elements of ~H by Rule A for “the same reasons as” E follows from ~H .
Subcase 1.1: E has a positive surface occurrence of a large molecule Pˇ⊓
⊔
(~t). Pick any a such that neither
any Pˇ a
⊔
-molecule nor any Pˇ ba -molecule (whatever b) have independent occurrences in E. Such an a exists, for
otherwise we would have at least m+1 independent occurrences of molecules in E (including the occurrence
of Pˇ⊓
⊔
(~t)), which contradicts Cond1. Let H be the result of replacing in E the above occurrence of Pˇ⊓
⊔
(~t) by
Pˇ a
⊔
(~t). ClearlyH ∈ ~H . Observe that when transferring from E to H , we just “downsize” Pˇ⊓
⊔
(~t) and otherwise
do not create any additional independent occurrences of molecules, so Cond1 continues to be satisfied for H .
Neither do we introduce any new non-surface occurrences of molecules or any new independent occurrences
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of small molecules, so Cond2 and Cond3 also continue to hold for H . And our choice of a obviously
guarantees that so does Cond4. To summarize, H is good. Therefore, by (41), CL4 ⊢ ⌊H⌋. Finally, note
that, when floorifying a given formula, both Pˇ⊓
⊔
(~t) and Pˇ a
⊔
(~t) get replaced by the same atom P (~t); and, as
the only difference between E and H is that H has Pˇ a
⊔
(~t) where E has Pˇ⊓
⊔
(~t), obviously ⌊H⌋ = ⌊E⌋. Thus,
CL4 ⊢ ⌊E⌋.
Subcase 1.2: E has a negative surface occurrence of a medium molecule Pˇ a
⊔
(~t). Pick any b such that E
does not have an independent occurrence of any Pˇ ab -molecule. Again, in view of Cond1, such a b exists. Let
H be the result of replacing in E the above occurrence of Pˇ a
⊔
(~t) by Pˇ ab (~t). Certainly H ∈
~H . Conditions
Cond1 and Cond2 continue to hold for H for the same reasons as in Subcase 1.1. In view of our choice of
b, Cond3 is also inherited by H from E. And so is Cond4, because H has the same positive occurrences of
(the same) molecules as E does. Thus, H is good. Therefore, by (41), CL4 ⊢ ⌊H⌋. It remains to show that
⌊H⌋ = ⌊E⌋. Note that when floorifying E, Pˇ a
⊔
(~t) gets replaced by P (~t). But so does Pˇ ab (~t) when floorifying
H because, by our choice of b, Pˇ ab (~t) is an isolated small molecule of H . Since the only difference between
H and E is that H has Pˇ ab (~t) where E has Pˇ
a
⊔
(~t), it is obvious that indeed ⌊H⌋ = ⌊E⌋.
Subcase 1.3: None of the above two conditions is satisfied. This means that in E all surface occur-
rences of large molecules are negative, and all surface occurrences of medium molecules are positive. Every
large molecule Pˇ⊓
⊔
(~t) is a ⊓-formula whose surface occurrences, as we remember, get replaced by ⊤ when
transferring from E to ‖E‖; but the same happens to the corresponding occurrences of P (~t) in ⌊E⌋ when
transferring from ⌊E⌋ to ‖⌊E⌋‖ because, as we have just noted, such occurrences are negative, and negative
surface occurences of general atoms get replaced by ⊤ when elementarizing CL4-formulas. Similarly, every
medium molecule Pˇ a
⊔
(~t) is a ⊔-formula so that its surface occurrences get replaced by ⊥ when transferring
from E to ‖E‖; but the same happens to the corresponding occurrences of P (~t) in ⌊E⌋ when transferring
from ⌊E⌋ to ‖⌊E⌋‖ because they are positive, and positive surface occurences of general atoms get replaced
by ⊥ when elementarizing CL4-formulas. Based on these observations, with a little thought we can see
that ‖⌊E⌋‖ is “almost the same” as ‖E‖; specifically, the only difference between these two formulas is that
‖⌊E⌋‖ has ⊥ where ‖E‖ has positive isolated (isolated in E and hence in ‖E‖) small molecules, and ‖⌊E⌋‖
has ⊤ where ‖E‖ has negative isolated small molecules. So, ‖⌊E⌋‖ is the result of replacing in ‖E‖ isolated
molecules by ⊥ or ⊤. Keeping this in mind, remember from classical logic — as we once already did in
the proof of Lemma 3.2 — that replacing an isolated atom (an atom p(~t) such that letter p has no other
occurrences in the formula) by whatever formula preserves validity. Thus, if ‖E‖ is classically valid, so is
‖⌊E⌋‖. But ‖E‖ indeed is classically valid because E is derived by Rule A. We conclude that
⌊E⌋ is stable. (42)
Subclaim 1.1
(i) Whenever ⌊E⌋ has a positive (resp. negative) quasiatom K of the form G1 ⊓ . . .⊓Gn (resp. G1 ⊔ . . .⊔
Gn), for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, there is a good formula H in ~H such that ⌊H⌋ is the result of replacing K by
Gi in ⌊E⌋.
(ii) Whenever ⌊E⌋ has a positive (resp. negative) quasiatom K of the form ⊓xG(x) (resp. ⊔xG(x)),
there is a good formula H in ~H such that ⌊H⌋ is the result of replacing K by G(y) in ⌊E⌋, where y is a
variable not occurring in ⌊E⌋.
For clause (i) of the subclaim, assume ⌊E⌋ has a positive (resp. negative) quasiatom K = G1 ⊓ . . . ⊓Gn
(resp. K = G1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Gn), and consider any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. The logical structure of E is the same as that
of ⌊E⌋, with the only difference that, wherever ⌊E⌋ has general atoms, E has molecules. Hence, where ⌊E⌋
has the above K, E has a positive (resp. negative) occurrence of a quasiatom K ′ = G′1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ G
′
n (resp.
K ′ = G′1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ G
′
n). Then, since E is derived from
~H by Rule A, ~H contains the result H (fix it) of
replacing K ′ by G′i in E. It is not hard to see that ⌊H⌋ is the result of replacing K by Gi in ⌊E⌋. What
remains to show now is that H is good. When transferring from E to H , Cond1 is inherited by H for the
same reason as in all of the previous cases. So is Cond2 because we are not creating any new non-surface
occurrences. Furthermore, since K ′ is not a molecule (for otherwise ⌊E⌋ would have a general atom instead
of K), Cond2 guarantees that K ′i is not a small or medium molecule. This means that, when transferring
from E to H , we are not creating new (nor destroying old) independent/surface occurrences of any small or
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medium molecules, so that Cond3 and Cond4 are also inherited by H from E. To summarize, H is indeed
good, and clause (i) of Subclaim 1.1 is thus proven. Clause (ii) can be handled in a similar way.
Now (42), (41) and Subclaim 1.1 immediately imply that ⌊E⌋ is derivable in CL4 by Rule A. We are
done with Subcase 1.3 and hence CASE 1.
The remaining two CASES 2 and 3 are about when E is derived by one of the Rules B1 or B2 from
a premise H . Such a H turns out to be good and hence (by the induction hypothesis) its floorification
CL4-provable. And, “almost always” ⌊E⌋ follows from ⌊H⌋ by B1 or B2 for the same reasons as E follows
from H . An exception is when H is the result of replacing in E a positive occurrence of a medium molecule
Pˇ a
⊔
(~t) by one of its disjuncts Pˇ ab (~t) (so that we are talking about an application of Rule B1) such that E
has a negative independent occurrence of a Pˇ ab -molecule. Using our earlier terms, this is a step signifying
⊤’s (final) decision to “match” the two P -based molecules. In this case, while ⌊E⌋ does not follow from
⌊H⌋ by Rule B1, it does so by Rule C. The secret is that the two P -based molecules are non-isolated small
molecules in H and hence remain elementary atoms in ⌊H⌋, while they turn into general atoms in ⌊E⌋.
CASE 2: E is derived by Rule B1. That is, we have CL3 ⊢ H , where H is the result of replacing in
E a negative (resp. positive) quasiatom K of the form G1 ⊓ . . . ⊓Gn (resp. G1 ⊔ . . . ⊔Gn) by Gi for some
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Fix these formulas and this number i. Just as in CASE 1 (statement (41)), based on the
induction hypothesis, we have:
If H is good, then CL4 ⊢ ⌊H⌋. (43)
We need to consider the following three subcases that cover all possibilities:
Subcase 2.1: K is not a molecule. Reasoning (almost) exactly as we did in the proof of Subclaim 1.1(i),
we find that H is good. Therefore, by (43), CL4 ⊢ ⌊H⌋. Now, a little thought can convince us that ⌊E⌋
follows from ⌊H⌋ by Rule B1, so that CL4 ⊢ ⌊E⌋.
Subcase 2.2: K is a large molecule Pˇ⊓
⊔
(~t). So, K is negative in E, and Gi = Pˇ
i
⊔
(~t). A (now already
routine for us) examination of Cond1-Cond4 reveals that each of these four conditions are inherited by H
from E, so that H is good. Therefore, by (43), CL4 ⊢ ⌊H⌋. Now, ⌊H⌋ can be easily seen to be the same as
⌊E⌋, and thus CL4 ⊢ ⌊E⌋.
Subcase 2.3: K is a medium molecule Pˇ a
⊔
(~t). So, K is positive in E, and Gi = Pˇ
a
i (~t). There are two
subsubcases to consider:
Subsubcase 2.3.1: E contains no independent occurrence of a Pˇ ai -molecule. One can easily verify that H
is good and that ⌊H⌋ = ⌊E⌋. By (43), we then get the desired CL4 ⊢ ⌊E⌋.
Subsubcase 2.3.2: E has an independent occurrence of a Pˇ ai -molecule Pˇ
a
i (
~t′). Since E also has a positive
independent occurrence of Pˇ a
⊔
(~t), Cond4 implies that the above occurrence of Pˇ ai (
~t′) in E is negative. This,
in conjunction with Cond3, means that E does not have any other independent occurrences of Pˇ ai -molecules,
and thus H has exactly two — one negative and one positive — independent occurrences of Pˇ ai -molecules.
This guarantees that Cond3 is satisfied for H , because H and E only differ in that H has Pˇ ai (~t) where E
has Pˇ a
⊔
(~t). Conditions Cond1 and Cond2 are straightforwardly inherited by H from E. Finally, Cond4
also transfers from E to H because, even though H — unlike E — has a positive independent occurrence
of a Pˇ ai -molecule, it no longer has a positive independent occurrence of a Pˇ
a
⊔
-molecule (which, by the same
condition Cond4 for E, was unique in E). Thus, H is good and, by (43), CL4 ⊢ ⌊H⌋. Note that since H
is good, by Cond2, the independent occurrences of Pˇ ai (
~t′) and and Pˇ ai (~t) in it are surface occurrences. The
same, of course, is true for the corresponding occurrences of Pˇ ai (
~t′) and Pˇ a
⊔
(~t) in E. Let us now compare ⌊E⌋
with ⌊H⌋. According to our earlier observation, there is only one independent occurrence of a Pˇ ai -molecule —
specifically, Pˇ ai (
~t′) — in E, i.e. Pˇ ai (
~t′) is E-isolated. Hence, when floorifying E, the independent occurrence
of Pˇ ai (
~t′) gets replaced by P (~t′) and the independent occurrence of Pˇ a
⊔
(~t) replaced by P (~t). On the other
hand, Pˇ ai (
~t′) is no longer isolated in H , so Pˇ ai (
~t′) stays as it is when floorifying H ; so does Pˇ ai (~t) because it is
not isolated in H , either. Based on this observation, we can easily see that the only difference between ⌊E⌋
and ⌊H⌋ is that ⌊E⌋ has P (~t) and P (~t′) where ⌊H⌋ has Pˇ ai (~t) and Pˇ
a
i (
~t′). Since ⌊E⌋ does not contain Pˇ ai
(because the only independent occurrence of a Pˇ ai -molecule got replaced by a general atom when floorifying
E), and since we deal with two — one positive and one negative — surface occurrences of P -based general
atoms in ⌊E⌋, we find that ⌊E⌋ follows from ⌊H⌋ by Rule C. We already know that CL4 ⊢ ⌊H⌋. Hence
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CL4 ⊢ ⌊E⌋.
CASE 3: E is derived by Rule B2. That is, we have CL3 ⊢ H , where H is the result of replacing in
E a negative (resp. positive) quasiatom K of the form ⊓xG(x) (resp. ⊔xG(x)) by G(t), with the known
restrictions on term t. This case is similar to CASE 2, but is, in fact, much simpler as K cannot be a
molecule, so we only deal with a situation corresponding to Subcase 2.1 of the previous case. The induction
hypothesis, as before, implies statement (43). A routine examination of Cond1-Cond4 reveals that these
conditions are inherited by H from E, so that, by (43), CL4 ⊢ ⌊H⌋. Now, ⌊E⌋ can be easily seen to follow
from ⌊H⌋ by Rule B2, so that CL4 ⊢ ⌊E⌋.
Claim 1 is proven.
Now we are close to finishing our proof of Lemma 5.1. Assume CL4 6⊢ F . Let ⌈F ⌉ be the result of
replacing in F all occurrences of each (n-ary) general atom P (t1, . . . , tn) by Pˇ
⊓
⊔
(t1, . . . , tn). Obviously ⌈F ⌉
is good. Clearly we also have ⌊⌈F ⌉⌋ = F , so that CL4 6⊢ ⌊⌈F ⌉⌋. Therefore, by Claim 1, CL3 6⊢ ⌈F ⌉. Hence,
by Theorem 5.9(b) of [6], there is an ⌈F ⌉-admissible interpretation † that interprets every elementary letter
as a finitary predicate of arithmetical complexity ∆2, such that
6|= ⌈F ⌉†. (44)
Since † interprets all letters of ⌈F ⌉ as finitary predicates, we may assume that none of those predicates
depend on any of the variables from our earlier-fixed pool z1, z2, . . . (otherwise, take any other variables
instead). Let ∗ be the interpretation17 that agrees with † on all elementary letters, and interprets each n-ary
general letter P ∈ P as P ∗(z1, . . . , zn) defined by
P ∗(z1, . . . , zn) =
(
Pˇ⊓
⊔
(z1, . . . , zn)
)†
.
Thus, ∗ interprets letters as promised in Lemma 5.1. To complete our proof, it remains to show is that ∗
is F -admissible and 6|= F ∗. In showing admissibility, we only need to care about general letters, because
elementary letters are taken care of by the fact that on them ∗ agrees with the ⌈F ⌉-admissible †.
Consider any general atom P (t1, . . . , tn) = P (~t) of F . Based on the ⌈F ⌉-admissibility of
† and our
assumption that the variables ~z = z1, . . . , zn are sufficiently “neutral”, the following two statements can be
verified by a routine analysis of the relevant definitions:
P ∗(~z) does not depend on any variables that are not among ~z but occur in F ; (45)
P ∗(~t) =
(
Pˇ⊓
⊔
(~t)
)†
. (46)
By (45), condition (i) of Definition 2.1 is satisfied. Next, as pointed out in [6], for every CL3-formula
E and interpretation ⋆, the game E⋆ is unistructural. So P ∗, which is
(
Pˇ⊓
⊔
(z1, . . . , zn)
)†
, is unistructural
and hence, of course, unistructural in all variables. This means that condition (ii) of Definition 2.1 is also
satisfied, and we conclude that ∗ is F -admissible.
Finally, based on (46), we immediately find that F ∗ = ⌈F ⌉†. This, by (44), implies 6|= F ∗. ✷
6 Decidability of the ∀, ∃-free fragment of CL4
This section is devoted to a proof of Theorem 2.5. Here we let F range over CL4-formulas not containing
blind quantifiers. The decidability of the question CL4 ⊢ F can be shown by induction on the aggregate
complexity of F , by which we mean the number of occurrences of logical operators plus the number of
occurrences of general atoms in F .
F is provable iff it is derivable from some provable formulas by one of the Rules A, B1, B2 or C. Our
decision procedure is a recursive one that tests, in turn, each of these four possibilities. If one of those four
tests succeeds, the procedure returns “yes”, otherwise returns “no”.
17For full accuracy, we should have said “an interpretation” here, because — out of laziness — we are not defining ∗ for
general letters not occurring in F . Earlier in this section we agreed to pretend that those letters simply do not exist. Such
letters are indeed irrelevant and, if there was any need, our ∗ could be extended to them in an arbitrary way.
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Testing Rules A, B1 and B2: These three tests are done in the same way as described in Section 10
of [6] for the ∀,∃-free fragment of CL3, and there is no need to (almost) literally reproduce that description
here. The fact that we deal with the more expressive language of CL4 hardly creates any differences: the
question of stability of a ∀,∃-free formula still remains decidable, and Lemma 9.1 of [6] on which some of our
old arguments relied is true for CL4-formulas for virtually the same reasons as it was true for CL3-formulas.
Testing Rule C: For each pair consisting of one positive and one negative surface occurrence of some
n-ary general letter P in F , do the following: pick an arbitrary (say, the lexicographically smallest) n-ary
non-logical elementary letter q not occurring in F , replace in F the above two occurrences of P by q, and see
if the resulting formula H is CL4-provable. The aggregate complexity of H is lower than that of F , so, by
the induction hypothesis, testing H for CL4-provability can be done effectively. Also, there is only a finite
number of such Hs to test. This is so because F only has finitely many (pairs of occurrences of) general
atoms P , and the above selection of a particular q is clearly irrelevant: the outcome would be the same if
any other — not occurring in F — n-ary non-logical elementary letter q′ was selected, for there would be
virtually no reason why a formula would be provable with q but not with q′. So, the whole procedure takes
a finite amount of time. If one of the above Hs turns out to be CL4-provable, the step is considered to have
succeeded. Otherwise it has failed. Of course our test is correct: it succeeds if and only if F is derivable by
Rule C.
As an aside, an analysis the above construction can easily convince us that:
Fact 6.1 Our decision algorithm for the ∀,∃-free fragment of CL4 runs in polynomial space.
7 Appendix A: Proof of Fact 2.2
Consider a CL4-formula F and an F -admissible interpretation ∗. We want to see that the game F ∗ is
defined, which can be done by induction on the complexity of F . The basis case of induction is trivial.
And the only nontrivial case in the inductive step is when the main operator of F is a blind quantifier.
This is so because all operations except blind quantification are defined for all problems. So, assume F
is ∀yG or ∃yG where, by the induction hypothesis, the game G∗ is defined. Then F ∗ is defined iff G∗ is
unistructural in y. In order to show that G∗ is y-unistructural, it would suffice to verify that, for every atom
E of G, E∗ is y-unistructural. This is so because, according to Theorem 14.1 of [2], each of the operations
¬,∧,∨,⊓,⊔,∀,∃,⊓,⊔ preserves the y-unistructural property.
Pick any atom E of G. If E is an elementary atom, then E∗, as an elementary game, is simply unistruc-
tural and hence y-unistructural. Now, for the rest of this proof, suppose E is an (n-ary) general atom
P (t1, . . . , tn), with P interpreted as P
∗(x1, . . . , xn). Our goal is to show that P
∗(t1, . . . , tn) is y-unistructural.
Without loss of generality, we may assume that, for some i (fix it) with 0 ≤ i ≤ n, we have t1 = . . . = ti = y
and y 6∈ {ti+1, . . . , tn}. Then, by clause (ii) of Definition 2.1,
P ∗(x1, . . . , xn) is unistructural in each of the variables x1, . . . , xi. (47)
Consider any two valuations e1 and e2 that agree on all variables but y. We want to verify that
Lre1[P
∗(t1,...,tn)] = Lre2[P
∗(t1,...,tn)]. (48)
Let e′1 (resp. e
′
2) be the valuation that agrees with e1 (resp. e2) on all variables that are not among x1, . . . , xn,
and sends each xj (1 ≤ j ≤ n) to e1(tj) (resp. e2(tj)). By Definition 4.1 of [6],
e1[P
∗(t1, . . . , tn)] = e
′
1[P
∗(x1, . . . , xn)] and e2[P
∗(t1, . . . , tn)] = e
′
2[P
∗(x1, . . . , xn)]. (49)
Claim 1 All variables on which e′1 and e
′
2 may disagree are among {x1, . . . , xi, y}; besides, if e
′
1 and e
′
2
(really) disagree on y, then P ∗(x1, . . . , xn) is unistructural in y.
To verify this claim, consider any variable z on which e′1 and e
′
2 disagree. By our assumption, each tj with
i < j ≤ n is different from y, so e1(tj) = e2(tj) and hence e′1(xj) = e
′
2(xj). This means that z — on which
e′1 and e
′
2 disagree — cannot be in {xi+1, . . . , xn}. So, if z ∈ {x1, . . . , xn}, then z must be in {x1, . . . , xi}.
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And, if here z = y, then, by (47), P ∗(x1, . . . , xn) is unistructural in y. Now suppose z 6∈ {x1, . . . , xn}. Unless
z = y, e1 and e2 agree on z and hence so do e
′
1 and e
′
2, which is a contradiction. So, z = y. Also, since
y 6∈ {x1, . . . , xn} and y occurs in F , condition (i) of Definition 2.1 implies that the game P ∗(x1, . . . , xn) does
not depend on y and hence is y-unistructural. Claim 1 is proven.
Combining (47) with Claim 1, we find that e′1 and e
′
2 only disagree on at most finitely many variables,
and the game P ∗(x1, . . . , xn) is unistructural in every variable on which e
′
1 and e
′
2 disagree. With a little
thought we can see that then Lre
′
1[P
∗(x1,...,xn)] = Lre
′
2[P
∗(x1,...,xn)] which, by (49), implies Lre1[P
∗(t1,...,tn)] =
Lre2[P
∗(t1,...,tn)]. This completes our proof of (48) and hence of Fact 2.2.
8 Appendix B: Proof of Fact 3.8
Assume F is any hyperformula, ∗ is an F -admissible interpretation, and ⋆ is the perfect interpretation induced
by (∗, e). We want to show that then ⋆ is also F -admissible. Just as in the proof of Lemma 3.9, we may
also assume that F does not contain hybrid atoms, for otherwise replace F with its general dehybridization.
Since ⋆ is a perfect interpretation, it automatically satisfies clause (i) of Definition 2.1. To see that clause
(ii) is also satisfied, pick any n-ary letter L of F , interpreted as L∗(x1, . . . , xn) by
∗ and as L⋆(x1, . . . , xn) by
⋆. It would suffice to show that whenever L∗ is unistructural in xi (1 ≤ i ≤ n), so is L⋆. For simplicity, let
us just consider the case i = 1. Assume L⋆ is not unistructural in x1, i.e. there are two valuations f and g
that agree on all variables but x1 such that Lr
f [L⋆] 6= Lrg[L
⋆]. Let a = f(x1), b = g(x1), c2 = f(x2) = g(x2),
. . . , cn = f(xn) = g(xn). Then clearly f [L
⋆] = L⋆(a, c2, . . . , cn) and g[L
⋆] = L⋆(b, c2, . . . , cn), so that
LrL
⋆(a,c2,...,cn) 6= LrL
⋆(b,c2,...,cn). From here, taking into account that ⋆ is the perfect interpretation induced
by (∗, e) and hence L⋆(a, c2, . . . , cn) = e[L
∗(a, c2, . . . , cn)] and L
⋆(b, c2, . . . , cn) = e[L
∗(b, c2, . . . , cn)], we find
Lre[L
∗(a,c2,...,cn)] 6= Lre[L
∗(b,c2,...,cn)]. The latter can be obviously rewritten as LrL
∗
e1
6= LrL
∗
e2
, where e1 and
e2 are the valuations with e1(x1) = a, e2(x1) = b, e1(x2) = e2(x2) = c2, . . . , e1(xn) = e2(xn) = cn, and
e1(y) = e2(y) = e(y) for every variable y 6∈ {x1, . . . , xn}. Since e1 and e2 agree on all variables but x1, we
find that L∗ is not x1-unistructural.
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